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What has been called the "Central Tradition"' of political
philosophy has long taught that the "State" is a moral communityindeed, that this is the State's central and defining attribute. The
Central Tradition has its roots in Greek political thought: As
Aristotle wrote in The Politics,
[A] city must concern itself with goodness if it is to be
truly... called a city.
... [A] community, where they only helped each other
against wrongdoers as in a defensive alliance, and each man
treated his own household like a city, would not even if they
came together seem a city to accurate observers, if the manner
of the association remained the same.... [The city is not the
sharing of a place, and does not exist to prevent wrong and
promote exchange. These are necessary conditions of there
being a city. But a city is not just the presence of all of them. It
is the community of households and the clans in the good life,
for the sake of perfect and self-sufficient life.3
In contrast to the teaching that the State is directed to the
perfection of life stands the powerful tradition of Liberalismvery roughly, the idea that the proper sphere of State action is
limited by private right, and consists for the most part (to use
Aristotle's words) in "prevent[ing] wrong and promot[ing]
exchange.'"
Although the Liberal Tradition is dominant in American

See ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC
1.
MORALITY 19-20 (1995) (remarking that the Central Tradition inspires politics to do more
than make people "safe, comfortable, and prosperous, but also to help make them
virtuous").
Id. at 21 ("No one deserves more credit (or blame) than Aristotle for shaping the
2.
central tradition's ideas about justice and political morality."). We do not, of course, deny
that other central influences on Western political thought, such as Christianity, have seen
the State as serving moral purposes. It must be remembered, however, that early preConstantinian Christianity taught that "the State, and the social order in
general... constitute... a sinful, lost world ... against a Church which alone can offer
redemption," and that it instilled in Christian believers a "dualistic tendency" towards "on
the one hand, acquiescence in the existing order; on the other, the sternest opposition to
the State, which reveals its demonic origin in the worship of the Emperor, in the refusal
to allow Christians to form their own associations, and in its cruel condemnation of the
Christians." 1 ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES
145-46, 148 (Olive Wyon trans., 1949).
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: BOOKS III AND IV 29-30 (Richard Robinson trans., 1962).
3.
For perhaps the most influential exposition of traditional Liberalism, see JOHN
4.
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 62-64 (J.W. Gough ed., 1947). Samuel Finer defines "a hard core of principle"
in Liberalism as "the precedence of the individual over the state: hence it demands
that ... basic political freedoms of the individual be protected from the state." 3 S.E.
FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES: EMPIRES, MONARCHIES
AND THE MODERN STATE 1569 (1999).
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constitutionalism,5 the Central Tradition also holds an important
place in it. American federalism, while severely limiting the
power of the central government to create a moral community on
a national scale, has also traditionally permitted States to
regulate morality by the prevailing standards of the local
community.6 Federalism, in other words, preserves a secure place
for the Central Tradition even within an overarching
constitutional framework dominated by Liberalism.7 The
Constitution addresses, almost exclusively, either the powers
that must be vested in the national government in order to
enable it to pursue certain limited ends (national defense, the
promotion of trans-border trade, and the like), or else the
procedures for choosing the leadership of the national
government or the bounds within which that leadership must
act.' The Constitution does not assign to the national government
the responsibility for pursuing any substantive conception of the
good; indeed, by implication, it denies the national government
any significant responsibility for such projects. In the eighteenthcentury context, the explicit constitutional prohibition in the
First Amendment of a national establishment of religioncoupled with the implied, and intended, protection for state
religious establishments-would have been emblematic of
precisely this division of authority between the two different
levels of government.9
This understanding of federalism plainly reflects the
intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers. Thus, in demarcating
State and federal spheres, Madison stated in The FederalistNo.
45 that "[t]he powers reserved to the several States will extend to

5. For a classic study of the subject, see Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION
(1955).
6.

See WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 66-67

(1964) (explaining how the States have traditionally regulated moral issues such as
marriage and sexual behavior).
7.
Another way to express this point is in terms of Michael Oakeshott's
illuminating distinction between the polity viewed as a "civil association," or
alternatively, as an "enterprise association." Viewed as a civil association, a polity seeks
primarily to maintain civil order, and does not attempt to impose or encourage any
preferred pattern of ends. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, MORALITY AND POLITICS IN MODERN
EUROPE: THE HARVARD LECTURES 62 (Shirley Robin Letwin ed., 1993). Viewed as an
enterprise association, the polity attempts to use law for substantive purposes, including
the legislation of morality. See id. at 101-03. American federalism can be seen as a
system creating a (primarily) civil association at the national level, but providing for and
preserving enterprise associations at the subnational level.
8.
See RIKER, supra note 6, at 20-25.
9.
(1998).

AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 32
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all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern
the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.""° Indeed,
Madison's celebrated account in The Federalist No. 10 of the
risks of capture of State legislatures by tyrannical factions and of
the consequent need for an effective national government to
dissipate and localize these risks presupposes that the States
may and will legislate particularistic, and therefore polarizing,
conceptions of the good." American federalism thus incorporates
and endorses the possibility of the enactment and enforcement of
morally normative 12 legislation on the State (as contrasted with
the national) level.
The judicial doctrine of the States' "police powers" has long
encapsulated this understanding of federalism.'" As explained in a
1900 U.S. Supreme Court case upholding a local ordinance banning
prostitutes from certain parts of a city, "[i]t has been often said that
the police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to
the nation, but was reserved to the States, and that upon them
rests the duty of so exercising it as to protect the public health and
morals." The breadth of the States' original police powers was also
underscored by the fact that the Court long construed the Bill of
Rights not to apply to the States," and by the patterns of
nineteenth- and early- to mid-twentieth-century state legislation
and case law. 6 Even recent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed
the power of local governments to regulate with a view to their
citizens' good habits and moral well-being. 7 Thus, reviewing the
10.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 260-61 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 45-52 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
11.
(explaining the advantage promised by the Union to break and control the violence of
factions).
Id. at 51 (noting the advantages of having the federal government deal with a
12.
national aggregation of interests while preserving local decisions to the States).
13.
L'Hote v. City of New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 588-90, 596, 600 (1900).
Id. at 596.
14.
15.
See, e.g., Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 250-51 (1833)
(promulgating the understanding that the Constitution was established "by the People of
the United States for themselves, for their own government, and not for the government
of the individual states"); see also AMAR, supra note 9, at 144-45 (reiterating that the Bill
of Rights favored by the Anti-Federalists sought limits on the federal government to
protect States' rights).
16.
See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins of State Power in
America, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1061, 1084-85 (1994) (surveying early legal practices and
relating the concept of the States' obligation to provide an institutional framework that
would foster the productive energies of society through the use of their police powers).
17.
See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 330-31, 341-44
(1986) (upholding a territorial law that sought to reduce casino gambling among
residents); cf 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489-90, 513 (1996)
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state of constitutional law in 1964, the noted political scientist
William Riker was able to say, as part of a classic study of
federalism, that
[a]lthough the liberal tradition has always denied that private
morality is of any concern to government, the fact is that
governments have invariably regulated such matters as
marriage, sexual behavior, the use of stimulants, sacrilege,
etc. In our tradition the states fully control these things,
although the Supreme Court sometimes has become
peripherally involved via the full faith and credit clause
(Article IV, Section I). In exceptional circumstances the United
States has indirectly controlled(e.g., by refusing to admit Utah
as a state until it prohibited polygamy and by prohibiting the
interstate transport of women for prostitution). 8
The traditional role of the States as moral communities has,
however, been called into question as a result of the perceived
demands of globalization. 9 The concept of globalization has
acquired several different meanings, and has been used to refer
to a complex and imperfectly understood phenomenon that works
on several planes." Regardless of whatever else "globalization"
may signify, however, it includes a constitutional dimension.
That constitutional dimension has recently been explored in
innovative and illuminating ways by Philip Bobbitt. Contrary to
analysts who perceive a global trend towards the sheer
disappearance of the "Nation State,"2 ' Bobbitt sees a transition
from the constitutional order of the Nation State to that of an
emerging "Market State."2 2 For Bobbitt, "Itlhe market-state is,
(rejecting State's claim to be able to ban truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages in
order to advance its legitimate interest in promoting temperance but recognizing the
State's interest in advancing temperance).
18.
RIKER, supra note 6, at 66 (emphasis added).
19.
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE CHOICE: GLOBAL DOMINATION OR GLOBAL
LEADERSHIP 139 (2004) (describing competing understandings of globalization as both a
signal of accessibility, transparency, and cooperation, and also as a symbol of moral
obtuseness and indifference to social injustice).
20.
See, e.g., id. at 139-40.
21.
See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications
for InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 7-8 (1997) (surveying evidence for,
and sources of decline of, the Nation State). But see, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, The
PersistentNation State and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 18 CARDOzO L. REV.
1083, 1089-92 (1996) (arguing that "decline of the Nation State has been greatly
exaggerated"). See generally ROBERT GILPIN, THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM:
THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 316-19 (2000) (reiterating the State's
importance as an actor in economic matters); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY:
ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999) (admitting that emerging international human rights
concerns have limited national autonomy, but noting that Nation States had never
enjoyed full autonomy in this regard).
22.
PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF
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above all, a mechanism for enhancing opportunity, for creating
our
with
something-possibilities-commensurate
imaginations." 23 The emergence of the Market State entails
between
relationships
for the
consequences
sweeping
governments-whether national or subnational-and their
citizens, as well as for the relationships between rival Market
American
of
context
the
In
themselves 2.
States
constitutionalism, the emergence of the Market State has been
taken to necessitate fundamental changes in conceptions of
federalism and, relatedly, of individual liberties.25
We agree with Bobbitt that a global transition from Nation
States to Market States is now well underway. The chief thesis of
this Article is that the Supreme Court has embarked on a
program of reshaping constitutional doctrine so as to encourage
and facilitate the emergence of a fully developed Market State in
this polity, with a view to positioning the United States to be
successful in meeting the competitive challenges of a new, postCold War international order. In taking this course, the Court
has increasingly aligned itself with the prescriptive views of
American business and political 6lites, for whom globalization is
understood "not merely [as] a diagnostic tool but also [as] an
globalization
action program."26 From this perspective,
"represents a great virtue: the transcendence of the traditional
restrictions on worldwide economic activity.., inherent" in the
era of Nation States. 7 Proponents of this vision of a globalized
economy characterize the United States as "a giant corporation
locked in a fierce competitive struggle with other nations for
economic survival," so that "the central task of the federal
the international competitiveness of
government" is "to increase
21
economy."
the American
Whether or not the Court's membership is fully conscious of
its role in underwriting this program does not ultimately
matter.2 9 It is sufficient if our explanation works merely as a
HISTORY 228 (2002).
23. Id. at 232.
24. Id. at 229-35 (explaining the changes the Market State will effectuate with
regard to security, political representation, and welfare).
25. Id. at 230 (discussing the change of the State's role from one enhancing the
nation as a whole, to one where the State is responsible for maximizing choices available
to individuals).
26. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 19, at 141.
Id.
27.
28. GILPIN, supra note 21, at 252.
29. The Court avowedly takes conscious account of the responses of foreign
governments and multinational corporations in "today's highly interdependent
commercial world" when framing its decisions. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran
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heuristic device-a reconstruction of how the Court would reason
if it were perfectly lucid and candid about the results it sought to
achieve.3" However self-aware the Court or its individual
members may be about the nature of this enterprise, the effect of
the Court's jurisprudence is to uproot historic premises of
American constitutional law. The Court's program might even be
considered revolutionary, insofar as it represents a tectonic shift
from one kind of constitutional order-the Nation State-to
another-the Market State.
The effects of the Court's activities are most visible in the
areas of federalism and the protection of individual liberties. In
both doctrinal areas, the Court no longer starts from premises
that once were axiomatic understandings of the scope and limits
of State power. In order to meet the perceived needs of the
emerging Market State, the Court has called into question the
historic authority of States, under the police power, to advance
self-consciously moral, avowedly nonutilitarian, goals. To put the
matter in somewhat Darwinian terms, the Court has registered
changes in the international environment that would reward
certain adaptations in constitutional doctrine, including new
kinds of relationships between the individual and the polity at
large. In response to this changed environment, the Court has
attempted to work these new relationships into the fabric of
constitutional law. In particular, to serve what it understands to
be the needs of the emerging Market State, the Court has set out
to eviscerate the traditional role of the States as moral
communities.
OVERVIEW

In essence, this Article attempts to explain the underlying
logic of two intersecting lines of recent Supreme Court decisions.
The first line of cases concerns the allocation of constitutional
power between the Nation and the States (i.e., cases about
S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739,
2782-83 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
30.
There is nothing particularly novel in this method of legal analysis. Scholars
have often sought to derive the Supreme Court's decisions from higher-order premises
unarticulated by the Court. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America:
The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 488-89

(2002) (attempting to ground the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence in a Tocquevillian
theory of governance). Indeed, what we are attempting here is nothing more than an
application of the hypothetico-deductive method common in both the natural and social
sciences: positing a hypothesis to explain the data, deriving consequences from the
hypothesis, and checking the data to see if it matches the predicted consequences. See
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 617-18
(1988) (explaining the hypothetico-deductive method).
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"federalism"); the other line concerns claims of individual right
against exercises of purported State power (i.e., cases about
"individual rights"). The federalism cases deal, respectively, with
the powers of the States against Congress in the regulation of
domestic matters"' and as against the Executive (and, less often,
Congress) in influencing foreign affairs. The individual rights
cases deal with equal access to State-provided benefits that take
account of race" and with State regulation of private
decisionmaking under the auspices of police power.3 Both lines of
cases can be understood as efforts by the Supreme Court to adapt
the American constitutional order to what it perceives as the
necessities of globalization, and specifically to the successful
transition from the constitutional order of the Nation State to
that of the Market State.
The concepts of Nation State and Market State require a
brief elucidation. The Nation State is a form of constitutional
order that took hold in the nineteenth century and dominated

31.
See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727 (2003) (holding
Congress could abrogate States' immunity by allowing employees to recover for State
violations of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 617 (2000) (holding Congress exceeded its authority in enacting federal civil remedy
for victims of gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)
(holding Congress exceeded its authority when it regulated gun possession in school
zones).
32.
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2394 (2003) (holding
that the State of California's Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA)
impermissibly interfered with the President's authority in foreign affairs); Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (holding Massachusetts law barring
trade by State entities with companies doing business with Burma unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause because preempted by Act of Congress); Barclays Bank PLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1994) (upholding California's taxation scheme
as applied to locally operating corporations with foreign parents and to foreign
subsidiaries).
See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2430 (2003) (holding that the
33.
University of Michigan's admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest in diversity).
34.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (holding that Texas
law prohibiting certain consensual sexual acts between consenting adults violated the
Due Process Clause); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (upholding Boy
Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive association to exclude homosexual
scoutmaster from membership); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding
that Colorado constitutional amendment precluding State legislature and localities from
enacting laws that prohibited discrimination against individuals based on their
homosexual practices or relations violates the Equal Protection Clause); Hurley v. IrishAm. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995)
(holding that Massachusetts law requiring private citizens to allow the marchers of a
group imparting a message that parade organizers did not wish to convey violated the
First Amendment); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(retaining and reaffirming Roe's "essential holding").
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most of the twentieth century. 5 The idea of the Nation State
assumed that the population of a State would consist primarily, if
not solely, of a particular "people"-understood in terms of
common historical consciousness and remembered (or imagined)
collective past, ethnicity, language, and possibly even religion.3 6
In Bobbitt's view, the Nation State's chief functions were to
ensure internal and external security, to expand material wealth,
to uphold civil and political rights of popular sovereignty, to
provide its people with economic security and a variety of public
goods, and to protect the State's cultural integrity. 7 To simplify
Bobbitt's complex and subtle thesis, the Nation State can no
longer perform these functions successfully," and a new
Bobbitt styles as the Market Stateconstitutional order-which
39
it.
supplant
must
Unlike the Nation State, the Market State is primarily a
facilitator of opportunities rather than a guarantor of outcomes. °
The Market State does not aim to promote the "welfare" of the
citizen body or national people, but rather to enlarge the array of
opportunities open to them.4'1 Accordingly, many of the Nation
35.
Movsesian, supra note 21, at 1084-86.
36.
Benedict Anderson has famously (and sympathetically) described Nation States
as "imagined communities." See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES:
REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 5-7 (rev. ed. 1991) (defining
the nation as "an imagined political community").
37.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 215-16.
For a summary of Bobbitt's argument, see infra text accompanying note 118.
38.
39. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228.
40.
Id. at 229-30.
41.
Id. In the Market State the distinction between citizen and noncitizen, which is
fundamental to the Nation State, becomes blurred. The contrast between the traditional
and more recent conception of the meaning of national citizenship is evident in the
various opinions in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), a case
discussing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to an alien apprehended in a
foreign country and then transported to the United States for arrest. Compare id. at 26566 ("[Tlhe purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect the people of the United
States against arbitrary action by their own Government; it was never suggested that the
provision was intended to restrain the actions of the Federal Government against aliens
outside of the United States territory."), with id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[A]liens
who are lawfully present in the United States are among those 'people' who are entitled to
the protection of the Bill of Rights"), and id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If we expect
aliens to obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution
when we investigate, prosecute, and punish them."). A similar tendency to devalue U.S.
citizenship, as opposed to alienage, can be seen at work in the plurality opinion of Hamdi
v.Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004), despite the opinion's assertion that it does not mean
to "give short shrift... to the privilege that is American citizenship." Id. at 2648. The
Hamdi plurality incongruously models a citizen's right to seek liberty from captivity as an
enemy combatant on a claimant's right to seek Social Security benefits-a model that
could arguably be applied to aliens. Id. at 2646 (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976) as providing the relevant test). Justices Scalia and Stevens, dissenting, would have
placed the rights of citizen and alien detainees on wholly different footings, and argued
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State's functions relating to the provision of welfare are
delegated or privatized by the Market State. For example,
deficiencies in the provision of social services, such as health care
or prison planning, are addressed through incentives directed
towards privatization or piecemeal private sector supplements,
rather than through redistributive programs.42 The Market State
is generally reluctant or even unable to manage economic
matters through democratically elected political bodies.4" It tends
to cede control over monetary policy to central banks and control
over exchange rates to the vagaries of currency markets."
Culturally, the Market State shies away from the idea of a
dominant or favored ethnicity, common substantive values and
traditions, or a shared way of life.45 "[T]he market-state is largely
indifferent to the norms of justice, or for that matter to any
particular set of moral values so long as law does not act as an
impediment to economic competition .... The sense of a single
polity, held together by adherence to fundamental values, is not a
sense that is cultivated by the market-state."" The Market State
does not even require its citizens to respect the most central
symbols of the Nation State, such as the Nation's
integrating
47
flag.
How is the transition from the Nation State paradigm to
that of the Market State reflected in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence? Assuming-again, if only as a heuristic devicethat the Supreme Court wishes to facilitate that transition, what
considerations would guide the Court's thinking in federalism
cases? In individual rights cases? In outline, we think the
answers are the following.
In the area of federalism, the emergence of the Market
State, with its strong decentralizing tendencies,48 would seem at
first to favor a robust form of federalism. After all, strong profederalism policies enable and encourage individual States to
that the former's rights should be measured according to a distinctive "tradition with
respect to American citizens." Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42.
BOBBIT, supra note 22, at 240-42.
Id. at 238-40 (explaining the Market State's influence and even attraction in
43.
precisely tying a candidate's ability to support campaigns through fundraising with the
interests judged to be important to them).
44.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 230.
45.
46.
Id.
See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-19 (1990) (concluding that the
47.
First Amendment protects flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)
(noting that while the U.S. flag serves "as a symbol of nationhood and national unity," a
conviction for "desecrating a flag" is not "consistent with the First Amendment").
48.
See BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 234.
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exploit their competitive advantages to the presumed good of the
greater whole. Pro-federalism policies will stimulate States to
find the mix of regulatory policy, taxation levels, crime control,
environmental protection, educational services, and welfare
benefits that will attract investment capital and draw
entrepreneurial elements of the population into the jurisdiction.4 9
Indeed, one might even expect to find that the jurisprudence of
the Market State invited States to take an untraditionally
assertive role in foreign affairs by becoming active members of an
international civil society that included other subnational or
transnational actors-such as nongovernmental organizations."
In other words, one might have expected to find in the Court's
cases a new federalism, not only in domestic affairs, but also in
foreign affairs.
Both kinds of new federalism, however, have encountered
sharp reversals in the Supreme Court's decisions. 5 In particular,
the Court has, at least for now, firmly nipped any budding
federalism in foreign affairs. 2 Yet these reversals are consistent
with the hypothesis that the Court is undertaking a program of
midwifing the birth of the Market State. Under the Court's
developing rationale, if the States were permitted to play a
significant role in foreign affairs, they would be too prone to
introduce (what are deprecatingly called) "moralisms" that would
tend to thwart the emergence of a Market State, i.e., the States

For a review of these and other advantages of federalism, see GEOFFREY R.
49.
STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 139-43 (4th ed. 2001); Nelson Lund, Federalismand
Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1046-47 (1997); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-93 (1987)
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)); Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988); and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two
Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 51-53 (2004) (noting that "[flederalism permits a diversity
of regulatory regimes from state to state, which may allow satisfaction of more people's
preferences, regulatory experimentation, and competition among states to provide the
most attractive regime").
50. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 236.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (holding that Congress's
51.
Commerce Clause authority includes power to prohibit local cultivation and use of
controlled substance in compliance with State "medical marijuana" law).
For a time, it had seemed to several legal writers that the post-Cold War decline
52.
of national sovereignty might favor a more robust role for subnational units, such as the
States, in foreign affairs. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's
Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 57-59
(2001); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1223-27
(1999) (observing that while "courts have slapped down state activity that poses even the
potential to complicate the nation's foreign relations," post-Cold War international society
has changed to include both Nation States and subnational governments, which
accordingly challenges the need for such "federal exclusivity").
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would adopt policies that inhibit the cross-border flow of trade
and alter the free workings of capital markets by subjecting them
to moral norms and judgments. 3 In the Court's view, the
"appropriate" role for the States in a globalized economy
precludes any such moral role. 4
The doctrinal trend described above is evident in American
55 in which the Court relied on a
Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi,
sweeping view of the President's preemptive powers to invalidate
an effort by California to advance the moral interest of
uncovering evidence of foreign corporate involvement in the
Holocaust.56 In Garamendi, the Court's majority tilted in favor of
federal policy, not only because the federal interest in an
international process for addressing the issue of Holocaust
insurance claims was implicated, but also because it found that
no significant State interest was involved.57 The case is not fully
explicable, therefore, as a restatement of the common view that
the federal government has the exclusive role, or at least the lead
role, in managing the Nation's foreign affairs;" it also required
the Court to discount the State's traditional role as a regulator of
insurance when the State's exercise of that authority impaired
relations with foreign insurers and reflected a judgment on the
morality of their conduct.5 9 The Court's decision to bar the State
from regulating in this manner was based on the doctrinally

53.
See Delahunty, supra note 52, at 58 (suggesting that emergent conceptions of
national sovereignty may authorize States to step forward to vindicate human rights).
Thus, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, opined that although
54.
California's attempt to ensure corporate truthfulness in describing the conditions of
workers at foreign facilities was a "legitimate, traditional, and important public
objective[]" for a State, nonetheless "a private 'false advertising' action brought on behalf
of the State, by one who has suffered no injury, threatens to impose a serious burden upon
speech." Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer subsequently reiterated and defended his Nike views at a speech at Harvard
University. See Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at the Harvard
University Tanner Lectures on Human Values 2004-2005: Our Democratic Constitution
14 (Nov. 17, 2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-ll-17-04.html
(preliminary draft).
123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
55.
See id. at 2379; Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance
56.
Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in ForeignAffairs, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825, 924 (2004) (calling the Court's opinion an endorsement of "the entirely novel
concept that presidential policy, unaided by explicit or implicit congressional
authorization, possesses the quality of a legislative act, at least to the extent of displacing
state law").
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2393.
57.
58.
See, e.g., First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nagional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 766-67
(1972) (discussing the superior competence of the federal executive branch in the area of
foreign affairs).
59.
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2390-93.
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questionable and unexamined assumption that mere executive
agreements based on the President's asserted Article II powers
can trump state law, even in the absence of action by Congress."
Given that Congress functions-and was designed to functionas a forum for articulating and defending the concerns of the
States,"' Garamendistruck a double blow against strong readings
of federalism: first by denying the weight and legitimacy of the
State's interest in subjecting foreign corporations operating
locally to the moral views of its citizens,6 2 and again by depriving
the State of the procedural protections it would enjoy at the
national level if unilateral executive action were held insufficient
to supersede State law.63
The Court's position on federalism in domestic affairs is
more complicated, although even here the most recent cases
represent a marked retreat from the Court's earlier
protectiveness towards the States." Cases such as United States
v. Lopez 5 and United States v. Morrison6 6 can be understood from
our perspective as efforts to preserve an area of noneconomic
activity for (primarily) State rather than federal regulation.
Noneconomic action, as Lopez and Morrison understand it,
appears to comprehend a large and important category of
activity, including, specifically, the regulation of most violent

60.
Id. at 2386-88, 2394. Even before Garamendi, the Court's assumptions and,
more generally, its views of the relation between executive foreign-affairs power and the
States had been subjected to withering criticisms by legal scholars. See, e.g., Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, ForeignAffairs, and Federalism,83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1622-24
(1997); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original
Understandingof Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341, 403-29 (1999).
But see Carlos Manuel Vzquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259, 1304-23
(2001) (arguing that the concerns raised by critics "do not justify the doctrine's
abandonment"). The GaramendiCourt displayed little or no awareness of these criticisms.
61.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1985)
("[Tihe Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints on federal
power over the States inhered principally in the workings of the National Government
itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority. State
sovereign interests, then, are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent
in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power. The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests
is apparent even today in the course of federal legislation.").
62.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2379, 2383 (overturning the California law extending
the statute of limitations "to allow state residents to sue in State court on insurance
claims based on acts perpetrated" during the Holocaust).
63.
Id. at 2390 (reaffirming the "Executive's responsibility for foreign affairs"
because of the potentially sensitive nature of dealing with foreign governments).
64.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005) (holding that the
Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to ban the growth and use of marijuana even
when such activities are legal according to State "medical marijuana" laws).
65.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
66.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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crimes and the provision of most education for the young. These,
of course, are core areas in which any public morality operates."8
Beyond those immediate objectives, the Lopez and Morrison
decisions also aimed to limit the power of the federal government
to reach "marriage, divorce, and child custody." 69 At stake in
these cases was the power of the States to function as genuine
moral communities that reflected local choices and values in such
sensitive areas.7" Preserving the Central Tradition's conception of
the States as moral communities happened to dovetail, in these
cases, with the quite distinct Market State conception of the
States, insofar as the latter envisages that the States will have
considerable discretion to devise local mixes of criminal law and
educational policy. But the Central Tradition's conception of the
States as moral communities is ultimately antagonistic to the
Market State's jurisprudence of federalism-as, perhaps, the
razor-thin majorities in Lopez and Morrison indicated.' The
Central Tradition sees the States as agents for the promotion of
the virtues; Market State federalism is founded ultimately on the
satisfaction of preferences and the promotion of economic
efficiency."2 The latent divergence between the two conceptions of
the States has become ever more apparent in the Court's
73
individual rights and equal protection cases.

67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-67 (refusing to "pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would ... convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States"); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613
(protecting "areas of traditional state regulation" by rejecting "the argument that
Congress may regulate noneconomic.., conduct based solely on the conduct's aggregate
effect on interstate commerce").
68. See Raich, 125 S. Ct at 2195 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The States' core police
powers have always included authority to define criminal law and to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of their citizens.").
69.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16.
70.
As Justice Souter argued in his Morrison dissent, the majority had a "new
animating theory" that "serv[ed] a conception of federalism. It is the instrument by which
assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly
discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the
individual States see fit." Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
71.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550 (5-4 decision); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600 (5-4
decision); BOBBIrr, supra note 22, at 228-42; GEORGE, supra note 1, at 20 (defending the
perfectionism of the Central Tradition's goal of promoting "morally upright and valuable
lives").
72.
Compare Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (Scalia, J.,
majority opinion) (rejecting analogizing U.S. federalism to European subsidiarity), with
id. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting that U.S. federalism should learn from
European subsidiarity principles, which focus on the effective, efficient cooperation of the
European Union and its member States and, accordingly, do not find objectionable
executive and legislative commandeering).
73.
For a different view of the relationships between the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence and its federalism cases, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When
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An early warning signal of the divergence came in the 1996
Romer v. Evans case, which invalidated, on equal protection
grounds, an amendment to a State constitution that prohibited
the State and its localities from adopting antidiscrimination laws
in favor of homosexuals.14 Romer's author, Justice Kennedy, had
been part of the Lopez-Morrison majorities, as was Justice
O'Connor, who joined the Romer opinion. 5 The Romer
dissenters-Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist-had also been members of the Lopez-Morrison
majorities, and sturdily defended in Romer the right of "the
majority of [a State's] citizens to preserve its view of sexual
morality statewide."7 6 More subtly, the Court's decisions in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale" and Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
8 signaled that
Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston"
the Courtincluding Justices in the Lopez-Morrison majorities-was
implicitly repudiating the concept that the States could condemn
certain conduct on moral grounds in the name of the polity as a
whole. 9 Strikingly in those two cases, the matter at issue was the
validity of antidiscrimination measures designed to protect
homosexuals, and on both occasions the Court invalidated the

It Matters: A Different Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2004)
(arguing that the Court's preemption decisions reflect the Court's deregulatory bias in
favor of business interests as well as its hostility to civil rights laws). On the contrary,
this Article finds an underlying pro-Market State bias at work in both types of
preemption cases that Chemerinsky contrasts.
74.
517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
75.
Id. at 621; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 550; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 600.
76.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 648 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Provocatively, Justice Scalia
wrote the following:
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The IStatel
constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a
"'bare... desire to harm'" homosexuals.., but is rather a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws.
Id. at 636. In speaking of a Kulturkampf, Justice Scalia is alluding to German Chancellor
Bismarck's "ultimately counter-productive effort to prevent the emergence of an
independent political force committed to social justice by subjecting Prussia's Catholic
Church to state control." JAMES JOLL, EUROPE SINCE 1870: AN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY 7
(1973).
77.
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
78.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
79.
See Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 ("Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained
greater social acceptance. But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amendment
protection to those who refuse to accept these views." (internal citation omitted)); Hurley,
515 U.S. at 660 ("While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful
behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an
approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightening either purpose
may strike the government.").
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antidiscrimination rules on the basis of their infringement on
First Amendment associational freedoms.S° Although the
resemblance to Romer may not be immediately apparent, the
underlying affinities of all three cases are deep and substantial:
The Court refused to permit the States to enforce a collective
moral judgment regarding homosexuality, whether to allow or to
disallow discrimination against it."' In effect, the Court was
enjoining on the States a wholly neutral, nonmoral role. Even
rules prohibiting private discrimination-which might be taken
for canonical expressions of collective moral judgments-were
impermissible in this area. 2 As will become apparent when we
consider Grutter v. Bollinger,s' the Court's hostility towards
morally-based State action has become so intense that it prefers
to regard even antidiscrimination norms as instrumental rules
rather than as moral judgments."4
The conceptual underpinning of the Romer, Dale and Hurley
cases-that the States are severely limited in their ability to
enforce the collective moral judgments of the political
community-is also central to the Court's other recent case law
on the subject of individual rights, including Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey8 and Lawrence v. Texas. 6
What is often overlooked, however, is the remarkable inner
coherence of the position of some Justices that, on the one hand,
rejects strong federalism in favor of claims for national and
executive power and, on the other hand, upholds claims of the
individual to be free from moral regulation in the private
sphere.87

80.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 659; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 ('Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our
81.
own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance."); Dale,
530 U.S. at 661 (holding that the Boy Scouts could exclude homosexuals and reasoning
that "public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's expression does not
justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept members"); Hurley, 515 U.S.
at 578 (allowing organizers of a private parade to exclude a homosexual group despite
protective legislation meant to "prevent any denial of access to (or discriminatory
treatment in) public accommodations on proscribed grounds, including sexual
orientation").
82. Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-61; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572-75, 578-79.
83.
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
84. But cf Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983) (condemning
racial discrimination as a violation of elementary justice).
85.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
86.
Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 644 (2000) (Souter, J., with
87.
whom Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, dissenting) (rejecting the Court's
reliance on the "theory of traditional state concern" as a limiting principle for the plenary
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This Article attempts to explore, with special reference to
Philip Bobbitt's work, the relationship between international
politics and constitutional law. Part I sets out a view of the
relationship between these two domains, demonstrating how
developments in international society and the international
political system can influence the reasoning of the Supreme
Court. Part I begins by discussing the international environment
created by globalization-an environment to which the
traditional functions and constitutional premises of the Nation
State appear badly adapted. These premises are described and
then contrasted with those found suitable to the emerging
Market State. Part I then examines the role of the Supreme
Court in smoothing the transition from the constitutional order
of the Nation State to that of the Market State, and considers the
jurisprudence of legal pragmatism, which enables the Court to
play the role that it desires here. Part I concludes by examining
earlier phases of the Court's history in which it has engineered
fundamental constitutional change with a view to the
international environment and the United States' competitive
position within it.
Part II explains the Supreme Court's traditional doctrine
concerning the sources and limits of the States' police powers, as
well as the relation of those powers to the elements of American
constitutional law that protect basic liberties. Part II begins by
demonstrating that established-and, indeed, recent-Supreme
Court precedent has treated the legislative codification of
community morality as a part of the police powers, and follows
with a survey of the Court's cases on the States' police powersincluding Commerce Clause, Privileges or Immunities Clause,
and substantive due process decisions. The historical survey
demonstrates that the Court's recent holdings, which strip the
States of their power to create and sustain moral communities,
are clearly contrary to the Court's own consistent teachings.
Part III explains how the premises of the traditional doctrine
have been uprooted though developments culminating in recent
decisions. Part III locates the ruling premise of several major
recent substantive due process decisions in the Court's belief in a
doctrine of radical autonomy: that the meaning of life is for the
individual alone to determine, in light of his or her attitudes
towards the suffering and joys incident to life. This ruling

national commerce power), with Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (Kennedy, J., delivering the
opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined) (holding
that the petitioners' "right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government").
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premise is understood to entail that the States may not attempt
to regulate and direct the individual's pursuit of pleasure or
avoidance of pain, at least in sexual activity, unless that conduct
causes direct and tangible harm to another "person" (in a
specifically constitutional sense of personhood). Rooted in cases
such as the joint opinion of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and
Souter in Casey, this doctrine serves as the master premise of the
Court's later decision in Lawrence. Casey and Lawrence, taken
together, represent decisive moves in restructuring American
federalism by contracting the authority of the States to express
and enforce traditional, commonly held- moral judgments.
Because they represent such a radical breach with the Court's
own precedents, the legal justification of these decisions is
problematic. This Article views the Court as, in pragmatic
fashion, appealing to and relying on 6lite opinion to support its
constitutional innovations.
Part IV argues that the Garamendi opinion further
illustrates the developments described in Part III and evidences
their extension to foreign-relations federalism. It is argued that
there is a direct link between (on the one hand) the Court's view
in its substantive due process and equal protection cases that the
States have no legitimate interest in enacting communitarian
moral judgments and (on the other hand) the Court's holding in
Garamendi that the State had little or no interest in securing
restitutionary justice for Holocaust survivors and their
descendants from foreign corporations. Part IV contends that
Garamendi posited an unprecedented and dubious view of the
President's power to preempt State law, and thus reached a
conclusion hostile both to "human rights internationalism"88 and
to the recognition of any role for the States in promoting moral
causes in foreign affairs. Moreover, we argue that Garamendi
should not be seen as a "sport": Its view that State regulatory
power should be directed primarily to economic ends rather than
to moral ones is also reflected in a dissenting opinion signed by
two key "centrist" Justices--Justice O'Connor and Justice
Breyer-in the Nike case.89 Deferring to 6lite foreign opinion, the
Garamendi Court thus eviscerates still further the conception of
the States as moral communities. Both in domestic and foreign
affairs, therefore, the States are--in the Court's current view-

88.
Curtis A. Bradley, World War II Compensation and Foreign Relations
Federalism,20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 282, 282-83 (2002).
89.
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S. Ct. 2554, 2567 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that "legal and practical checks... tend to keep the energies of public enforcement
agencies focused upon more purely economic harm").
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largely destitute of power to legislate moral opinion. Confining
the States to largely instrumentalist, efficiency-promoting tasks,
however, also deepens and entrenches the constitutionalization
of the Market State.
Part V closes with some reflections on the likelihood that the
Court's project, as envisaged, will be successful. Fittingly enough,
the final judgment on a pragmatic judiciary is whether its
constitutional responses to the Nation's strategic environment
will, in the end, be pragmatically justified.
I.

A.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Globalizationand ConstitutionalLaw

Globalization has been variously characterized either as the
ruling ideology of American hegemony in international politics or
as a necessary response to technological change. 0 Neither of
these stark views seems correct: Globalization forces the United
States' polity, economy, and culture into accommodations with
those of other nations, rather than merely exporting American
models elsewhere; and technological change interacts with, and
may be modified or arrested by, ideational causes in producing
political, economic, or cultural outcomes.9 1 Philip Bobbitt comes
closer to the truth by arguing that American constitutional law is
shaped, not only by the technological requirements for success in
the international environment, but also by the perceived
principles of legitimacy in the international system. 92
In his panoramic vision of the history of States, Bobbitt
argues that the current international system of Nation States is
yielding to a new international order, centered on what he terms
the Market State.93 Bobbitt contends that the rise of the Market
State is based on the demise of the Nation State. 94 Epochal
struggles for supremacy took place throughout most of the
90.
See BRZEZINSKI, supra note 19, at 139-41 (distinguishing and illustrating
"diagnostic" and "doctrinal" meanings of globalization and noting that globalization is
"driven largely by the new technologies of communications"). Compare THOMAS L.
FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE, at xv (1999) (emphasizing technological
determinism in discussing globalization), with RICHARD FALK, LAW IN AN EMERGING
GLOBAL VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE 215-16 (1998) (employing a
constructivist methodology in describing globalization).
91.
See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND -THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans., 2004) (arguing that ideational factors as well as
material changes entered into the emergence of early modern capitalism).
92.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228.
93.
Id.
94. Id.
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twentieth century among the fascist, communist, and liberalcapitalist versions of the Nation State.95 In this competition, the
liberal-capitalist models, represented by the United States and
post-war Europe and Japan, emerged triumphant primarily
because they did a better job than their fascist and communist
rivals of harnessing the technological revolutions in nuclear
weapons, information, and communications.9 6 The very triumph
of the liberal-capitalist version of the Nation State has, however,
through what Hegel would have called the "cunning of Reason,""
begun to undermine the premises of the traditional Nation State.
This evolutionary process is ushering in a new domestic
constitutional order that requires a new basis for legitimacy98
and, correlatively, a new international legal and political order.99
These developments have, in turn, given rise to a period of
renewed international struggle, in which three competing
versions of the Market State-a highly entrepreneurial model
represented by the United States, a strongly managerial model
represented by Europe, and a decidedly mercantilist model
exemplified in Japan-will contend for supremacy in ways that
will resemble the Market State's emergence from the epochal
wars of the Nation State and that will force and reward major
technological and strategic innovations.' 0 As the technological
creativity of the liberal-capitalist Nation State provided for its
triumph in the wars against fascism and communism by
liberating individuals to pursue excellence and invention,'0 ' so too
will the next set of epochal wars produce the distinctive strategic,
economic, and cultural attributes that will characterize the
successful States of the future.

95.
See id. 34-64 (describing the European political struggles of the early twentieth
century).
96. Id. at 215-28.
97.

See BURLEIGH TAYLOR WILKINS, HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

138-40

(1974) (noting that "the cunning of Reason acknowledges the importance of the
unintended consequences of intentional human action" and that usually "these
consequences can be viewed teleologically as furthering man's freedom").
98.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213.
99.
See id. at 258-64 (discussing America's nationalist and internationalist models
and the balance of international power in the "New Realism").
100.
See id. at 667-76 (outlining how "[tihe new orthodoxy of the market-state
will ... play out in several competing formulations"). It seems a likely defect in Bobbitt's
scenario that he does not consider the emergence of China and India as competitors
potentially on the level of the United States, Europe, or Japan. For a corrective vision, see
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD

ORDER 218-19 (1996) (commenting on the effect of Asia's economic development and
growing self-confidence on international politics).
101.
See BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 216, 228-31.
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Bobbitt outlines the domestic constitutional arrangements
that he believes will be instituted as the logic of the Market State
progressively displaces that of the Nation State.' °2 In brief,
Bobbitt sees the central move in the transition from the Nation
State to the Market State as the abandonment of the State's
responsibility for securing the welfare of the community as the
basis for State legitimacy. Responsibility for welfare promotion
will be replaced by the responsibility for promoting the
opportunities of the State's individual citizens.' 3 Accordingly,
this Part will first describe the traditional constitutional
characteristics of the Nation State; second, identify the
contrasting features of the Market State; and third, summarize
the innovations which apparently best adapt the American
Constitution to the requirements of the emergent Market State.
B. The ConstitutionalPremisesof the Nation State
According to Bobbitt, the Nation State "defines itself by its
axiomatic linkage to a people and its portrayal as their
benefactor." 4 Bobbitt locates the emergence of the Nation State's
constitutional order in the transformation of the American Civil
War.'0 ' Building on the example of French revolutionary armies,
Bobbitt contends that Lincoln's great strategic achievement was
inventing "total war."01 6 Waging total war required mass
mobilization' that could be sustained only by a constitutional
order purporting to represent a Nation of citizens10 8-a single
102.
See id. at 214-34 (explaining that the State's shifting focus from the
population's welfare as a whole to maximizing individual choice requires governmental
restraint).
103.
Id. at 228-30.
104.
Id. at 208.
105.
Id. at 215-16 (stating that the Nation State's characteristic of waging "total
war" can be seen in the American Civil War).
106.
Id. at 203.
107.
Id. at 216 (noting that the strategy of total war involves mobilizing all the
"resources of the society in pursuit of its political goals"). Although a proposal for
conscription into the federal army had been mooted in the War of 1812, see The Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 384-85 (1918) (noting that "[pleace came before the bill
was enacted"), the first federal statute imposing conscription was the Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731. See The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. at 386-87 (stating that
the Act applied to "all the citizens of the United States" and made "every male citizen of
the United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five... subject.., to be called by
compulsory draft to service in a national army"). As the Court noted, the compulsory
mobilization of the citizenry for military service was followed soon after by the Fourteenth
Amendment's transformation of the character of American citizenship from State-based to
predominantly national. Id. at 377; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
108.
The post-Civil War period explored the possibility of constitutionalizing the
concept of national citizenship-an innovation that was ripe with possibilities to work
basic changes between the individual and the local States-until that possibility was
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people composed by a multi-ethnic American republic."°9 Justice
Holmes, himself a Civil War veteran, explained that "it has taken
a century and has cost the] successors [of the Founding
generation] much sweat and blood to prove that they created a
nation.""' In Germany, Bismarck's key strategic innovation, the
introduction of compulsory social insurance, was equally
significant for the emergence of the Nation State's constitutional
order."' The military and economic innovations made possible by
the Nation State caused it to become the dominant form of State
into the next century.
The Nation State, so viewed, represents a bargain between
the State and its people: On the one side, there is the people's
commitment to upholding the State by the willing sacrifice of
wealth, liberty, and even life; on the other, there is a reciprocal
pledge by the State to provide for the people's welfare."' In
America, the Nation State's commitment to the welfare of the
community prescribed a set of principles that ultimately shaped
post-New Deal constitutional change."' Chief among these
principles was the recognition of the Nation State's authority, not
only to provide public goods and to correct market failures, but
also to pursue certain collective moral goals-such as wealth
redistribution, a social safety net, and eventually racial
of
private
regulation
significant
equality" 4 -through
largely extinguished by the Supreme Court. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 35-45 (1975) (discussing how the Supreme Court limited the concept of national
citizenship by its narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the
Slaughter-HouseCases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)).
In its multi-ethnic character, the American Nation State has been and remains
109.
strikingly different from the racially-based European and Japanese versions of the Nation
State; indeed, this feature of the American Nation State may arguably give it a persisting
competitive advantage over those nations. But see PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000, at
523-25 (1987) (arguing that the multitude of interests competing within the American
polity creates certain liabilities not shared by its competitors).
110.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
111.
BOBBITT,supra note 22, at 203-04.
The Court in The Selective Draft Law Cases assumed such a bargain when it
112.
argued that "the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes
the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the
right to compel it." 245 U.S. at 378. That bargain seems to have dissolved on both sides.
As Sir Michael Howard has noted, while "an individual commitment, however notional, to
dying for one's country" was characteristic of the Nation State's heyday, "by the end of the
twentieth century death was no longer seen as being part of the social contract." MICHAEL
HOWARD, THE INVENTION OF PEACE: REFLECTIONS ON WAR AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER
99-100 (2000).
113. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 214-18.
114. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257-58 (1964)
(affirming Congress's power to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations
and citing earlier precedent concerning congressional regulation of morally objectionable
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contracting"'5 and regulation of the use of private property."6 In
subordinating private liberty to the needs of the community, the
New Deal Supreme Court proclaimed that "regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the
interests of the community is due process."" 7
Bobbitt argues persuasively that the constitutional order of
the Nation State is no longer tenable. Bobbitt explains that,
viewed from the angle of the Nation State's post-Cold War
defaults,
[NIo nation-state can assure its citizens safety from
weapons of mass destruction; no nation-state can, by
obeying its own national laws (including its international
treaties) be assured that its leaders will not be arraigned as
criminals or its behavior be used as a legal justification for
international coercion; no nation-state can effectively
control its own economic life or its own currency; no nationstate can protect its culture and way of life from the
depiction and presentation of images and ideas, however
foreign or offensive; no nation-state can protect its society
from transnational perils, such as ozone depletion, global
warming, and infectious epidemics. And yet guaranteeing
national security, civil peace through law, economic
development and stability, international tranquility and
equality, were the principal tasks of the nation-state.""
Further, the financial burdens of a commitment to the "everimproving welfare of its citizens"--aggravated in the West by
demographic considerations and, perhaps, by growing difficulties
in extracting taxes-is one of the reasons why the contemporary
Nation State appears to be defaulting on its side of the bargain."9
activity in interstate commerce). The Court noted, "That Congress was legislating against
moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing
(the Civil Rights Act] Congress was also dealing with what it considered a moral
problem." Id. at 257.
115.
W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937) (finding a
Washington minimum wage law for women constitutional, the Court explained, "The
community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable
employers. The community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which
springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest.").
116.
Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232 (1984) (determining that the
State legislature could redistribute traditional land holdings because the legislature could
legitimately conclude that "concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the
State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare").
W. CoastHotel, 300 U.S. at 391.
117.
118.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 228.
Id. at 222; see also Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political
119.
Communities in the GlobalAge, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1251, 1255 (2004) (maintaining that,
"[alt present, the [Nation) State seems to become increasingly unable to fulfill its citizens'
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Bobbitt wrote, before September 11, 2001, that the very
nature of the Nation State now debars it from performing its
vital function of providing "internal security against crime and
terrorism."'' ° This critical failure is, he believes, "a consequence
of the national character of nation-states, which isolates and
alienates substantial minorities of their citizens even to the point
ways. " 12 1
of defining some criminal behavior in essential ethnic
Bobbitt adds that
[t]he ethnic focus of the nation-state, its pervasive analogy
to the family, creates a role for antisocial elements,
"misfits," that is connected to violence because violence is
the currency of the state. In every society there are such
people, and such groups; in the nation-state they become
the enemy of the State (and vice versa), because the22 State
itself is fused to a national conception of the culture.
needs and consequently the citizens turn away from it and search for alternative[s]").
BOBBIrIT, supra note 22, at 219.
120.
121. Id.
Id. Other writers have pointed out the difficulties that European societies in
122.
particular have experienced in assimilating and integrating their large Islamic
populations. These commentators have noted that even apparently fully assimilated
second- and third-generation Muslims often feel little identification with the surrounding
polity. See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 100, at 264-65 (offering reasons why
Muslim minorities may be harder to assimilate-both in Europe and non-Western
cultures-than other religious minorities or ethnic groups); GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR
MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE WEST 241-87 (Pascale Ghazaleh trans., 2004)
(commenting on terrorism in Europe and the battle over Islam); OLIVIER ROY,
GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 143-46, 315-17 (2004) (describing
the "general pattern of radicalisation [sic] in Europe" and its relationship to the Muslim
youth culture). Indeed, young European-born Muslims are proving to be willing recruits
to jihad with alarming frequency. The bombing of commuter trains in Madrid in March,
2004-an incident that left 191 dead and more than 1800 wounded-was allegedly caused
by men "raised and schooled in Spain." David Crawford & Keith Johnson, EU's New
Threat: Radicals With Passports:Local Islamic Youth Join Jihad,Posing Big Challenge
for Security Officals There, ASIAN WALL ST. J. (Hong Kong), Dec. 29, 2004, at A8; see also
KEPEL, supra, at 241-48; Renwick McLean, Bombings in Spain Are Seen as a Sign of
Basque Group's Decline, Not Strength, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2004, at A16 (reporting the
number wounded). Spanish police "arrested more than 70 suspected Islamic terrorists [in
20041-most of whom [had been] legally registered as long-term residents." Crawford &
Johnson, supra. In November 2004, a prominent Dutch filmmaker, Theo van Gogh, was
assassinated, allegedly by Mohammed Bouyeri, a twenty-six year old Dutch Muslim.
Bouyeri, the child of Moroccan immigrants to Holland, grew up in a suburb of
Amsterdam, had written pieces celebrating mutual tolerance and respect, and was a
former community organizer who "worked passionately to channel the frustrations of
young Muslims like himself into positive programs" not long before his conversion to
radical Islam. Glenn Frankel, From Civic Activist to Alleged Terrorist:Suspect in Killing
of Dutch Director Was Radicalized, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2004, at Al. The mayor of
Amsterdam, Job Cohen, said of Bouyeri that "[a] couple of years ago he was a welleducated guy with good prospects." Andrew Higgins, A Brutal Killing Opens Dutch Eyes
to Threat of Terror: Crackdown on Radical Islam Follows Filmmaker'sDeath; Immigrants
Get Scrutiny: Shifting View of Welfare State, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at Al. In light of
such cases, European terrorist experts say that their continent "is also proving to be a
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Moreover, Bobbitt writes,
[Tiwo opposing but interacting phenomena-the oppression
of minority groups by the nation (that is, by the dominant
ethnic group with whom the State is identified) and the
resistance to an assimilation that might overcome
oppression-are damaging to the legitimacy of those nationstates that are based on the promise of assuring equality
among all national members. As a result, it is increasingly
difficult in multicultural, multiethnic states to get
consensus on public-order problems and the maintenance2 3of
State.
rule-based legal action, which are core tasks of the
To summarize Bobbitt's argument, it is the confluence of
increasing costs of governance-exacerbated by the availability of
weapons of mass destruction to nonstate actors and the new
a legitimacy crisis in its
information technology-and
redistributivist and communitarian goals that, taken together,
doom the constitutional order of the Nation State.
C.

The ConstitutionalPremisesof the Market State

By contrast, according to Bobbitt, the Market State's
legitimizing principle is a commitment to individual
Different models of the
opportunity-not to collective welfare.'
Market State-the "Entrepreneurial," "Managerial," and
"Mercantile" models (i.e., the American, European, and Japanese
models)--offer varied interpretations of what it means to
maximize opportunity. 2 ' The Entrepreneurial, or American,
model is of chief interest here.

good substitute for Afghanistan" in training jihadists; one "longtime investigator" is
quoted as saying, "[cilearly, the threat we have to target now is that next generation."
Crawford & Johnson, supra.
The noted scholar of European Islam, Gilles Kepel, head of Middle East studies
at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, has recently said that, "[tihis [cultural]
schizophrenia is the most dangerous thing we face in Europe today ....It means Madrid.
It means Mohamed Atta." Evan Osnos, Islam Shaping a New Europe; Staking Out Their
Place in Europe, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2004, at 1. Another scholar, Paul Scheffer of the
University of Amsterdam, noted that while many second- and third-generation Muslims
are integrating successfully into Dutch society, "others are living more and more distant
from it and, indeed, expressing hatred and contempt for it." Carol Eisenberg, A Deadly
CulturalDivide: ConcernsAbout Terrorism Have Spotlighted the FailureAcross Europe to
Integratea Fast-GrowingMuslim Minority, NEWSDAY, Dec. 6, 2004, at A04.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 225 (footnote omitted).
123.
124.
Id. at 228-30.
125.
Id. at 672-74 (describing the essential features of each Market State model); see
also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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"The basic ethos of the Entrepreneurial Model is
libertarian... .""' The libertarian ethic of the Entrepreneurial
Model embodies
the conviction that it is the role of society to set individuals
free to make their own decisions. This ethos counsels
minimal state intervention in the economy as well as in the
private lives of its citizens. Privatized health care, housing,
pensions, and education as well as low taxes and low
welfare benefits all characterize such states. Regulation on
behalf of special interests is discouraged. Indeed,
responsibility for regulation of any kind is largely abdicated
in favor of policing by the market, which responds with
to the consumer, who is expected to
extensive information
127
look out for himself.
Fully enacting the libertarian agenda of the Entrepreneurial
version of the Market State would imply radical changes in
American constitutional law. In particular, on libertarian
premises, any claim by the government to regulate private
conduct for the sake of promoting commonly recognized forms of
moral virtue would presumptively be illegitimate, or
"unconstitutional."'28 From the libertarian angle, it makes
excellent constitutional sense to ask: "[Wihy in the West is
marijuana criminalized but martinis are not? Why is polygamy
criminalized but not divorce?"'29 Bobbitt argues that "It]he sense
of a single polity, held together by adherence to fundamental
values, is not a sense that is cultivated by the market-state. This
the market-state an
cultural indifference does, however, make
13
0
multiculturalism."
for
ideal environment
The constitutionalizing of Market-State libertarianism has
clear implications for the structure, as well as for the ends, of
government. The radical authority of the individual to set the
bounds for his or her own opportunities, with the Market State
as primus inter pares facilitator, might at first suggest an
increased demand for more devolution of authority to States and
localities."' Neither the market, nor the national government,

126.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 671.
Id.
127.
128.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2484 (2003) (declaring that "[t]he
State cannot... mak[e] [a homosexual's] private sexual conduct a crime").
129.
BOBBIT, supra note 22, at 219.
130. Id. at 230.
131.
It might also suggest increased privatization of traditional State functions, such
as the responsibility for education. Although steps in this direction-such as school
voucher programs-have been challenged under the Religion Clauses, the Court has
(guardedly, and by a slim majority) supported them. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
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need be the best provider of all kinds of services (e.g., protection
against local crime); in some instances, States and local
governments, or private nonprofit organizations, may be better
equipped to carry out the necessary responsibilities. Insofar as
the States' comparative advantage in performing such functions
stems from their greater ability to respond to purely local values
and needs, however, the Market State's intrinsic libertarianism
will often collide with any attempt to augment State power
beyond strict limits. In such conflicts, the constitution of the
Market State would treat libertarianism as primary, and
federalism as subordinate and instrumental. Thus, local States
attempting to regulate genetic research, abortion, or sexual
orientation would swiftly find themselves charged with
"unconstitutional"
encroachments
on individual welfare
conflicts it seems
In
such
maximization and autonomy.
overwhelmingly likely that the claims of federalism would be
subordinated to libertarianism by judges managing a
constitutional transformation to the Market State.
D. ConstitutionalLaw Transformationand the Jurisprudenceof
Legal Pragmatism
Bobbitt's theory requires the belief that the American
constitutional order is under severe strain insofar as it rests
specifically on Nation State premises, and therefore must change
"to reflect a new constitutional archetype" that meets the
"demands for new bases for legitimacy, demands ...aris [ing] in
part as a consequence of the strategic innovations that won the
Long War."'32 How is this shift to a new "constitutional
archetype" to be accomplished?
Basic changes in constitutional structure-such as the
transformation to the Nation State-have often been birthed by
violence, as represented by the Civil War in the United States
and by Bismarck's successful wars culminating in the formation
of the German Empire. 3' It seems most unlikely, however, that
the United States' transition to the Market State, already far
U.S. 639, 652-53 (2002) (holding that Ohio's Pilot Project Scholarship Program is
constitutional). The Zelman Court noted,
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest thus make clear that where a government aid
program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a
broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools
wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the
program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 652.
132. BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213.
Id. at 24-26, 177.
133.
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along the way, will be marked by violence. Although the
possibility of a financial or currency crisis as a catalyst for
change can by no means be ruled out,"' the ordinary mechanisms
of American politics may prove adequate to manage aspects of
the transition, especially those relating to national security and
public finance. But a significant role in engineering the change
will undoubtedly be-indeed, this Article will attempt to show
that it has already been-assumed by the Supreme Court.
Yet ascribing the role of constitutional architect to a body
that professes to be merely a constitutional interpreter is
paradoxical. How can the Supreme Court, while purporting to
work within the ambit of its own constitutional doctrines, so
refashion those materials as to create not merely novel, but
fundamentally incompatible, doctrines? Consistent with his
earlier work," 5 Bobbitt appears to believe that the constitution of
the American Nation State can be judicially remade to facilitate
the American Market State, without departing from existing
modes of constitutional argument. He emphasizes
that such a transformation does not mean that the present
U.S. constitution will be replaced. It has already weathered
one such transformation in the constitutional order, that
from state-nation to nation-state, and its underlying theory
of popular sovereignty, personal liberty, and individual
equality is perfectly compatible with the multicultural
market-state. On some issues, though, such as federalism
and the regulatory powers of Congress, it may be
interpreted in the new archetypal context in ways that are
more restrictive of government; while in others, notably
national security, the power of the executive may gain. But
none of these developments require a departure from the
available constitutional arguments that currently make up
American constitutional law, even if the outcomes of

134.

See NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE 279-80

(2004) (pointing out that "the United States is the world's biggest borrower.... In 2002
the deficit was 4.8 percent of GDP; in 2003 it was even higher."); Robert Z. Aliber, The
Dollar's Day of Reckoning, WILSON Q., Winter 2005, at 14, 23-24 (commenting that it is
unlikely the inevitable transition to a sustainable situation will occur without "significant
effects on employment and inflation or major disruptions in the foreign-exchange
market"); Peter G. Peterson, Riding For a Fall, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 111,
117-21 (discussing the borrowing practices of the U.S. government and reporting that
"[v]irtually none of the policy leaders, financial traders, and economists ... believes the
U.S. current account deficit is sustainable at current levels for much longer than five
more years. Many see a real risk of a crisis").
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-8
135.
(1982) (outlining five distinct modes of argument as the explanatory device for
understanding the work product of the Supreme Court).
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constitutional decision making were to undergo some
considerable change.
Bobbitt's claim that the Court may accomplish a change in
"constitutional archetypes" while operating only within the range
of "available constitutional arguments that currently make up
American constitutional law" 37 is questionable. The Court's
fidelity to constitutional text and structure, to the historical
understandings of the framers and ratifiers, to the Court's own
doctrines and precedents, and to the longstanding practices of
American government sets boundaries-even if broad ones-to
the Court's authority to introduce radical innovations in
constitutional law.18 To be sure, the Court has not always felt
handcuffed by such constraints.39 But the fact that it has favored
modes of argument leading to such conclusions, or even met with
acquiescence when it has ventured that far, does not establish
that such "outcomes of constitutional decision making" are
legitimate. The Court may be the (illegitimate) agent of change
from one "constitutional archetype" 40 to another, even while
seeking to maintain the outward faqade of constitutional
continuity and purporting to play a merely interpretive role.
Nonetheless, the Court seems prepared to undertake the
task of spearheading the constitutional transition from a Nation
State to a Market State by demanding a certain style of
jurisprudence--one that tolerates a very relaxed approach to
doctrinal reasoning that can be characterized as a kind of "legal
pragmatism."' Legal pragmatism seems to us to be very evident
42
in the Court's decisions that are of most concern to this Article.
Not altogether easy to define, legal pragmatism, in Professor
Daniel Farber's words, "tries to analyze problems based on both
social policy and traditional legal doctrines, seeking a
satisfactory adjustment of the two.... [The) blend of principle
and policy, of tradition and innovation, is the essence of legal

BOBBITT7, supra note 22, at 213 n.t.
136.
Id. at 213 & n.t.
137.
138.
See Nelson Lund, The Rehnquist Court's PragmaticApproach to Civil Rights, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 249, 249-51 (2004) (commenting on the Rehnquist Court's consideration of
precedent, interpretive fidelity, and the history, text, and structure of laws).
Id. at 251 (noting that in one particular case, "the Court's pragmatic concern
139.
with results overpowered all such specifically legal considerations").
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 213.
140.
See Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
141.
1331, 1377 (1988) ("The alternative is a less structured mode of decision making called
legal pragmatism.").
See Lund, supra note 138, at 249-51 (finding a legal pragmatism characteristic
142.
in the Rehnquist Court's antidiscrimination decisions).
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pragmatism."'
Another scholar, Judge Richard Posner,
characterizes legal pragmatism as
a functional, policy-saturated, nonlegalistic, naturalistic,
and skeptical, but decidedly not cynical, conception of the
legal process....

Legal rules are to be viewed in instrumental terms,
implying contestability, revisability, mutability.
Law is forward-looking. This is implicit in an
instrumental concept of law-which is the pragmatic
concept of law, law as the servant of human needs.
...The judge is not merely an interpreter of legal
4
materials. He is not only a finder but also a maker of law.
Legal pragmatism is influenced by American philosophical
pragmatism, 14 which classically drew on evolutionary and
related statistical reasoning to develop a conception of truth as a
mere device for manipulating effects to produce wanted
outcomes.'46 Truth was what worked, not what corresponded to
reality.4 4 Like statistical thinking, philosophical pragmatism saw
reality as consisting in individual cases, with generalizations
143.
Farber, supra note 141, at 1377.
144.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 26, 29 (1990).
145.
See generally A.J. Ayer, Introduction to WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND THE
MEANING OF TRUTH,at vii, vii-xiv (A.J. Ayer ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1978) (discussing
the origins of James's pragmatism and the theory of truth's roots in the history of
American philosophy).
146.
RICHARD RoRTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 27 (1999). Philosophical
pragmatism maintains its long link to evolutionary theory's account of selection, because
pragmatic "truth" is what confers competitive advantage in seeking survival.
Pragmatists-both classical and 'neo-'--do not believe that there is a way things
really are. So they want to replace the appearance-reality distinction by that
between descriptions of the world and of ourselves which are less useful and
those which are more useful. When the question 'useful for what?' is pressed,
they have nothing to say except 'useful to create a better future.' When they are
asked, 'Better by what criterion?', they have no detailed answer, any more than
the first mammals could specify in what respects they were better than the
dying dinosaurs.
Id.
147.
See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201-32, 435-45 (2001) (drawing
the connection between evolutionary and statistical reasoning and the philosophy of
pragmatism, conceived by Charles Pierce but reformulated and popularized by William
James, and ultimately extended to judicial reasoning by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr.). It is a great historical irony that it was the pragmatic conception of law, an approach
that found its roots in evolutionary thinking, that inspired Holmes to condemn a parallel
influence of evolutionary thinking on the political process when he wrote, dissenting in
Lochner v. New York, that "Itihe Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics." 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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amounting to no more than useful devices to identify a truth
revealed only indirectly by probable variations in error.
The adoption of legal pragmatism as a preferred style of
judicial decisionmaking is closely connected to the Court's
implicit recognition that it must reshape constitutional law in
order to secure comparative advantages for the United States in
a competitive international environment. Three characteristics of
legal pragmatism make it particularly suitable as a
jurisprudential style for a Court attempting to respond to
international
circumstances that present what Bobbitt
characterizes as strategic threats. 9
First, a pragmatic Court will discount traditional legal
doctrine and precedent and be open to even drastic or abrupt
revisions of seemingly settled law.' A pragmatic Court should
espouse a very relaxed (not to say, cavalier) doctrine of
constitutional stare decisis-which is part of the current Court's
approach.'' The great exceptions, of course, are those cases in
which an outward profession of belief in a strong stare decisis
doctrine is felt to be pragmatically necessary to sustain the
Court's prestige and to legitimize its decisions.1 Second, a
pragmatic Court will rely heavily on nonlegal materials,
including the policy recommendations of amici, in its reasoning.
Third, a pragmatic Court will demonstrate a willingness to step
into the breaches created, as the Justices see it, by the defaults of
political actors.' Such a Court will attempt to solve social or

148.
See MENAND, supra note 147, at 177-200 (discussing the place of the law of
errors in the development of philosophical thought).
149.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 811-14.
150.
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 860--65 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (arguing that the substantive due process methodology employed
to decide the case had been specifically rejected the previous Term).
151.
See, e.g., id.
152.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-66 (1992).
Informed by pragmatic considerations, the Court purports to "explain why overruling
Roe's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare
decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power."
Id. at 865; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 1029-39 (2003) (criticizing Casey as demonstrating
the Court's concern with retaining political clout and asserting that "a significant part of
Casey's justification for... stare decisis ... is that it enhances public perceptions of the
Court's (and its members') integrity, and thus safeguards the Court's power").
153.
Indeed, as the philosopher Richard Rorty points out, the courts may spice their
pragmatism with "visions," as he believes was true in "such debatable decisions as Brown
v. Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, .. . and some [then) future Supreme Court decision
that will strike down antisodomy laws." RORTY, supra note 146, at 97-98 (footnotes
omitted). Pragmatic judges, as Rorty notes, hardly need be tentative or complacent; their
decisions may be "breakthroughs into romance." Id. at 99.
154.
See Justice Scalia's view of the plurality decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S.
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political problems that are constitutionally committed to other
governmental bodies if those actors prove unable or unwilling to
address them.'5 5 Indeed, a pragmatic Court will characteristically
see its very isolation from the political process as an institutional
advantage that justifies its resolution of political or cultural
issues that electorally responsive bodies may be reluctant to
decide."'
All three of these features of legal pragmatism, discussed
more in depth below, were exhibited in Brown v. Board of
Education,"' an important and illuminating precedent for Courtled constitutional change in response to a strategic threat posed
by the international environment.'
E. Precedentfor ConstitutionalChange in Response to "Strategic
Threats"
It has not been uncommon for the Supreme Court to
introduce fundamental legal and constitutional innovations on
the basis of its perception of the surrounding international
Ct. 2633, 2660-75 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Hamdi plurality held that U.S.
citizens detained as enemy combatants within the United States are entitled, as a matter
of due process, to have a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for detention
before a neutral decisionmaker. As Justice Scalia saw it, however, the plurality was
attempting to
mak[e] up for Congress's failure to invoke the Suspension [of the Writ of Habeas]
Clause... [and to] mak[e] up for the Executive's failure to apply what [the
plurality] says are needed procedures-an approach that reflects what might be
called a Mr. Fix-it Mentality. The plurality seems to view it as its mission to
Make Everything Come Out Right, rather than merely to decree the
consequences, as far as individual rights are concerned, of the other two
branches' actions and omissions. Has the Legislature failed to suspend the writ
in the current dire emergency? Well, we will remedy that failure by prescribing
the reasonable conditions that a suspension should have included. And has the
Executive failed to live up to those reasonable conditions? Well, we will ourselves
make that failure good, so that this dangerous fellow (if he is dangerous) need
not be set free.
Id. at 2673.
155.
Id.
156.
See BOBBIrT, supra note 135, at 4 (noting the possibility "that insulation from
political reaction... [may] actually fit the Court to be the conservator of constitutional
principles"). Thus, Richard Rorty becomes starry-eyed about pragmatic judges-those
"wise elders" who "don their best to keep America intact" and who "are, and deserved to
be, revered'-precisely because they stand above the banalities and compromises of the
political process. RORTY, supra note 146, at 112. "As our presidents, political parties and
legislators become ever more corrupt and frivolous, we turn to the judiciary as the only
political institution for which we can still feel something like awe." Id. It does not seem to
have occurred to Rorty, however, that the political process may have become debased
largely because the courts have siphoned off so much responsibility from elected
politicians.
157.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
158.
BOBBIr, supra note 22, at 777-80.
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environment." 9 The most famous example may well be the
historic decisions to end racial segregation in American public
and Brown's
schools in Brown v. Board of Education,'
6
companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe. ' At least one current
member of the Court understands Brown, as we do, as directly
responsive to the international environment in which the
decision was handed down. 162 Brown itself was the culmination of
159.
The doctrine of "territorial incorporation," which grew out of the Court's Insular
Cases, provides a clear example of constitutional decisionmaking of this kind. GARY
LAWSON & Guy SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 197 (2004) ("The doctrine of 'territorial incorporation' that
emerged from The Insular Cases is transparently an invention designed to facilitate the
felt needs of a particular moment in American history. Felt needs generally make bad
law, and The InsularCases are no exception.").
For other cases in this vein, see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp.,
Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 409-10 (1990) (refusing to extend the Act of State doctrine to cover a
case in which foreign governmental officials were alleged to have accepted bribes for
military contracts in violation of U.S. antitrust and antiracketeering law); Banco
Nagional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("[We decide only that the
Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its own
territory by a foreign sovereign government... in the absence of a treaty ... even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law."); and The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900) (examining the pedigree of the international
maritime custom of exempting fishing ships and their cargo from seizure as prizes of war
and holding that this exemption is part of American law).
The Court's uncertainty persists as to whether, and how far, to incorporate
international law as a rule of decision for domestic courts. This is shown by the Court's
equivocal interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct.
2739 (2004). Echoing Sabbatino, the Sosa Court expressed wariness about "consider[ing]
suits under [international] rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power of
foreign governments over their own citizens, and... hold[ing] that a foreign government
or its agent has transgressed those limits.... [Miany attempts by federal courts to craft
remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse
foreign policy consequences." Id. at 2763; see also id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(limiting the application of the statute by invoking "those notions of comity that lead each
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its laws and
their enforcement"). The Court's caution is well-taken; indeed, the Court should arguably
have been far more cautious than it was. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 450-51 (1999) (arguing that
"[i]nternational legal theory is in disarray" and that customary international law lacks
both legitimacy and effectiveness); Michael D. Ramsey, The Empirical Dilemma of
InternationalLaw, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1243, 1245-51 (2004) (questioning "whether
U.S. courts are institutionally equipped for the project" of applying international law, and
discussing the difficulties of conducting empirical investigations of modern international
law).
160.
347 U.S. at 495 (declaring that "'separate but equal'" in public education
violates equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment).
161.
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding "that racial segregation in the public schools
of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution").
162.
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct., Speech at Columbia
University School of Law: Brown v. Board of Education in InternationalContext (Oct. 21,
2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-10-25-04.html
(arguing
that "[a]lthough the Brown decision did not refer to the international stage, there is little
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a series of landmark civil rights cases in which the Court took
account of that environment.
63 four
Six years before Brown, in Oyama v. California,'
Justices took note of international influences in their opinions on
the question whether to protect people of Japanese descent from
discriminatory State land laws that regulated certain categories
of land ownership on the basis of nationality.' The year of this
decision, 1948, is significant in that it places the case at the very
outset of the Cold War.'65 Justice Black, joined by Justice
Douglas, noted the relevance of the United Nations Charter's
nondiscrimination provisions to the case. 66 Justice Murphy,
joined by Justice Rutledge, argued further that the California
statute "from its inception has proved an embarrassment to the
United States Government," and like Justice Black pointed out
that the statute "stands as a barrier" to the United States'
fulfillment of its United Nations Charter obligations.
In several of the pre-Brown cases in this line, the Court was
responding to prodding from the executive branch, which itself
was highly sensitive to growing international condemnation of
American racial segregation. The Truman Administration
repeatedly filed briefs urging the Supreme Court to mitigate, and
finally to strike down, State-supported racial segregation. 6 The
first such brief appeared in Shelley v. Kraemer,169 a restrictive
doubt that the climate of the era explains, in significant part, why apartheid in America
began to unravel after World War II").
163.
332 U.S. 633 (1948).
164.
See id. at 647-50 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring);
Paul Gordon Lauren, First Principles of Racial Equality: History and the Politics and
Diplomacy of Human Rights Provisions in the United Nations Charter,in RACE AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO THE PRESENT 25, 48 (Michael L. Krenn
ed., 1998). Six Justices comprised the majority, with four Justices concurring in two
opinions written by Justices Black and Murphy. Three Justices dissented in two separate
dissenting opinions. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635 (majority opinion); id. at 647 (Black, J.
concurring); id. at 650 (Murphy, J. concurring); id. at 674 (Reed, J., dissenting); id. at 684
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
165. THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RACE
RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 46-47 (2001) (stating that "[tihe Cold War developed
after 1945").
166.
Oyama, 332 U.S. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring).
167.
Id. at 672-73 (Murphy, J., concurring).
168.
BORSTELMANN, supra note 165, at 57 ("No judges were immune from the Cold
War atmosphere that heightened international attention to American race relations, and
the Truman administration made good use of these judicial breakthroughs in its
diplomacy abroad.... Truman's Justice Department consistently intervened in civil
rights cases in an effort to convince the country's highest court of the negative impact of
officially sanctioned racial discrimination on American foreign relations.").
169.
334 U.S. 1 (1948); MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 91 (2000) (noting that the Truman Administration's
participation in civil rights cases began with Shelley).
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covenant case in which whites sold residential property to blacks
in violation of a landowner's covenant. 17 The question presented
was whether State court enforcement of such covenants was
"state action" in violation of the rights of the black purchasers. 71
Solicitor General Philip Perlman explained the Justice
Department's interest in Shelley by noting that "racially
restrictive covenants hampered the federal government 'in doing
its duty in the fields of public health, housing, home finance, and
in the conduct of foreign affairs."17' The Justice Department's
amicus curiae brief followed the State Department's view that
"'the United States has been embarrassed in the conduct of
foreign relations
by acts of discrimination taking place in this
173
country."
Two years later, the Justice Department again emphasized
the international implications of U.S. race relations in the
7 4
amicus curiae brief it submitted in Henderson v. United States.
This case challenged segregation in railroad dining cars.'75 The
Justice Department's brief informed the Court of Soviet and
other foreign criticisms of American race discrimination and
included quotes of statements by foreign governmental
representatives (i.e., the Soviet Union and Poland) at "a United
Nations subcommittee meeting that 'typify the manner in which
racial discrimination in this country is turned against us in the
international field.""76 The Justice Department's brief opposed
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which had ruled
that separate seating in dining cars for black passengers did not
violate the statutory equal treatment requirement of the
Interstate Commerce Act. 77 The Justice Department disagreed
with the ICC's reading of that statute and argued that if such
segregation was authorized, it was an equal protection
violation.'
The Justice Department's argument is significant

170.
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4-5 (framing the case as "questions relating to the validity
of court enforcement of... restrictive covenants, which have as their purpose the
exclusion of persons of designated race or color from the ownership or occupancy of real
property").
171.
Id. at 13-14 (recognizing that the Fourteenth Amendment only bars State, not
private, action); DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 91.
172.
DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 91 (emphasis added).
173.
Id. at 91-92.
174.
339 U.S. 816 (1950); DuDZIAK, supra note 169, at 92.
175.
Henderson, 339 U.S. at 818; DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 92.
176.
DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 92-93 (quoting Brief for the United States at 6061, Henderson,339 U.S. 816 (No. 25)).
177.
Id. at 92.
178.
Id.
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because the decision in Henderson might have resulted (although
in fact it did not)179 in the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson."'8
The Justice Department was forthright in advising the
Court of the foreign policy consequences of its constitutional
decisionmaking in Sweatt v. Painter' and McLaurin v.
Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education,8 ' both of which
were challenges to the segregation of black postgraduate
students at public universities.'83 The Justice Department's brief
in the cases again stressed that the practice of racial segregation
in the United States posed a danger to the United States'
national security and its reputation in other countries:
"It is in the context of a world in which freedom and
equality must become living realities, if the democratic way
of life is to survive, that the issues in these cases should be
viewed. In these times, when even the foundations of our
free institutions are not altogether secure, it is especially
important that it again be unequivocally affirmed that the
Constitution... places no limitation, express or implied, on
the principle of the equality of all men before the law."'84
The Justice Department's amicus brief in the consolidated
school desegregation cases, which included Bolling and Brown,
was even more emphatic on the foreign policy consequences of
the Court's constitutional ruling in the case. 8 ' The Justice
Department told the Court that racial segregation frustrated the
Government's pursuit of its Cold War aims because "'[r]acial
discrimination furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda
mills, and it raises doubts even among friendly nations as to the
intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.""8

179.
Id. at 94 (noting that because the "Court ruled that railroad dining car
segregation violated the Interstate Commerce Act because it was unequal treatment," it
"did not need to decide whether... Plessy v. Ferguson should be overturned").
180.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
339 U.S. 629 (1950).
181.
339 U.S. 637 (1950).
182.
Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 631; McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638; DuDzIAK, supra note 169,
183.
at 94-95.
DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 95-96 (quoting Memorandum for the United States
184.
as Amicus Curiae at 11-13, McLaurin, 339 U.S. 637 (No. 34) and Sweatt, 339 U.S. 629
(No. 44)).
Id. at 99 (explaining how the Justice Department's "brief emphasized the
185.
embarrassment of race discrimination in the nation's capital").
186.
Id. at 100 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10)).
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The Government's
brief spent nearly two pages
substantiating this claim by a lengthy quote from a letter written
by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who explained,
"[D]uring the past six years, the damage to our foreign
relations attributable to [race discrimination] has become
progressively greater. The United States is under constant
attack in the foreign press, over the foreign radio, and in
such international bodies as the United Nations because of
various practices of discrimination against minority groups
in this country. As might be expected, Soviet spokesmen
regularly exploit this situation in propaganda against the
United States ....
[Tihe hostile reaction among normally friendly peoples,
many of whom are particularly sensitive in regard to the
status of non-European races, is growing in alarming
proportions ....
...

[R]acial discrimination in the United States remains a

source of constant embarrassment to this Government in
the day-to-day conduct of its foreign relations; and it
jeopardizes the effective maintenance of our moral
leadership
of the free and democratic nations of the
,8 7
world.
The Government's briefs in Brown and the civil rights cases
leading up to it were "a call to arms to enlist the Court
in... safeguarding national security in the Cold War.""'8
Although the Brown decision itself did not refer to foreign
relations, the public diplomacy requirements of the Cold War
undoubtedly played a role in the Court's judgment that a halfcentury of jurisprudence expressed in the separate-but-equal
doctrine of Plessy was no longer constitutionally tenable. 9 And
"[w]ithin an hour of the Chief Justice's announcement of the
Court's unanimous conclusion ... the Voice of America broadcast
the news, in 34 languages, around the globe. The U.S.

187.
Id. at 100-01 (first two alterations in original) (quoting Memorandum for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10)). Justice
Ginsburg emphasized the importance of Secretary Acheson's remarks in her speech at
Columbia University Law School. Ginsburg, supra note 162.
188.
DUDZIAK, supra note 169, at 104.
189.
Id.; Ginsburg, supra note 162; see BORSTELMANN, supra note 165, at 93 ("The
Court's logic in Brown was at least partly international .... The Court's decision did not
specifically cite the Cold War or the retreat of colonialism in the rest of the world, but the
justices could not help being affected by the dominant political and social realities of their
time.").
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Information Agency promptly placed articles on Brown in almost
every African journal."19
Brown underscores two relevant lessons. First, Brown freed
the Court to transform American constitutional law, enhancing
its self-confidence as a policymaking organ."' The prestige that
accrued to the Court from Brown bolstered the Court's
willingness to mediate later change from one constitutional order
to another. As in Brown, the Court in later cases has been
prepared to make dramatic constitutional innovations that it
considers necessary to enable the United States to address
strategic international needs.
Second, Brown helped generate the self-consciously
"pragmatic" jurisprudence that has encouraged and enabled the
Court to undertake constitutional transformations dictated by
perceived strategic needs. Brown was not altogether well
received by legal scholars at the time; indeed, a substantial body
of criticism developed, suggesting that the Court had imposed its
own values on the political community. 9 ' But the critique of the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown and later cases did not have
the intended effect; rather, it gave rise to a school of
jurisprudence explicitly defending the right and duty of the
Supreme Court to make pragmatic judgments concerning
preferred social outcomes in constitutional law. 9 ' And there
things stand.
II. THE CENTRAL TRADITION AND THE POLICE POWER IN
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Our argument requires us to show that the Court is indeed
reordering constitutional law, i.e., that its increased willingness
to deny that the States may enact and enforce locally prevalent
moral norms and values is contrary to its traditional
jurisprudence on the subject of the States' police powers. Here we
try to substantiate that claim.

190. Ginsburg, supra note 162.
191. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (declaring the Court's
interpretation of the Constitution to be the supreme law of the land).
192.

See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1374

(1990) (observing that in terms of an originalist interpretation of the Constitution, the
case was wrongly decided); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26-27, 33-34 (1959).
193. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 192, at 1371 (positing that "the Court's survival and
flourishing are indeed more likely to depend on the political acceptability of its results
than on its adherence to an esoteric philosophy of interpretation").
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Traditionally, the Court's jurisprudence has supported the
view that the States may legislate to promote the community's
distinctively moral objectives-that is, that the States may
legislate within the Central Tradition of political theory. Part II
begins with a survey of that earlier jurisprudence. This review
encompasses the description and analysis not only of the Court's
traditional view of the States' police powers (often defined in
opposition to the powers of Congress), but more generally of the
States' power to regulate conduct deemed vicious or immoral
(often defined by reference to the scope of constitutionally
protected individual liberties). Thereafter, Part II shows how the
Court's recent decisions represent a striking departure from its
earlier (and better established) jurisprudence-a departure that
this Article believes is designed to be adaptive to the assumed
requirements of globalization and, specifically, to the emergence
of a Market State constitution.
OVERVIEW: THE STATES' POWERS OF MORAL APPRECIATION

The States' authority to pursue specifically moral objectives
is deeply rooted in the American constitutional tradition. Indeed,
94
it is one of the fundamental features of our federalism.
Typically, the legal analysis of this form of State authority is part
of the doctrine of the States' "police power," which itself falls
under the more general doctrine of the States' "reserved
powers."'95 Consequently, our review starts with the Court's
delineation of the scope of the States' reserved powers.
The relevant decisions fall into three main categories. First,
the police powers are sometimes defined by inference from the
Court's jurisprudence regarding the enumerated powers of the
federal government, such as Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. Second, they have been defined by reference
to the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Third, they may be defined in relation to the conceptions of
substantive due process.9 6

194. For a detailed historical account, see generally Novak, supra note 16, providing
a detailed historical account of the evolution of the balance of private rights with public
values.
195. See, e.g., L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 596 (1900) (stating that "the
police power was not by the Federal Constitution transferred to the nation, but was
reserved to the States").
196. This Article will also briefly discuss certain aspects of the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence closely related to the relevant substantive due process
conceptions.
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A. The Reserved Powers of the States-The Contours of the
Police Power
In the Court's earliest formulation, the reserved powers of
the States were described in sweeping terms. Discussing State
inspections in Gibbons v. Ogden,"7 Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote, "They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation,
which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not
surrendered to the general government: all which can be most
advantageously exercised by the States themselves." 9 ' Although
Marshall's language does not identify the purposes for which the
reserved powers may be exercised, the later course of Commerce
Clause and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence makes clear
power included the moral
that the objects of State legislative
99
objectives of the community.

In Champion v. Ames, °° in the course of upholding a federal
ban on interstate commerce of lottery tickets, the Court, through
the first Justice Harlan, stated,
[T]he suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or
morality is among the most important duties of
Government ....
If a State, when considering legislation for the
suppression of lotteries within its own limits, may properly
take into view the evils that inhere in the raising of money, in
that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that
such commerce shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery
tickets from one State to another?
... As a State may, for the purpose of guarding the

morals of its own people, forbid all sales of lottery tickets
within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose of guarding the
people of the United States against the "widespread pestilence
of lotteries" and to protect the commerce which concerns all
the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from
one State to another.201

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
197.
198.
Id. at 203.
See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (justifying a State
199.
law prohibiting lotteries-even though recognizing that this law interfered with some
individuals' rights to contract-because the State's duty to suppress moral nuisances was
paramount).
200.
188 U.S. 321 (1903).
201.
Id. at 356-57.
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In dissent, Justice Fuller agreed with the premise of Justice
Harlan's argument, that the States themselves retained the power
to abolish lotteries for essentially moral reasons." 2 Indeed, he went
further, arguing that the States' power to permit or prohibit
lotteries was exclusive: "[T]hat power belongs to the States and not
to Congress. To hold that Congress has general police power would
be to hold that it may accomplish objects not entrusted to the
General Government, and to defeat the operation of the Tenth
Amendment."" 3
A decade later, in sustaining the Mann Act's attack on so-called
"white slavery, " "' or prostitution, the Court reaffirmed the power of
the federal government to regulate interstate commerce, even if its
purpose in so doing was explicitly moral."°5 Justice McKenna,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated,
[If the facility of interstate transportation can be taken away
from the demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of
obscene literature, the contagion of diseased cattle or persons,
the impurity of food and drugs, the like facility can be taken
away from the systematic enticement to and the enslavement
in prostitution and debauchery of women, and, more
insistently, of girls.20 6
In Hammer v. Dagenhart, 7 the Court, while rejecting the
extension of this line of cases to a congressional act banning the
products of child labor from interstate commerce, reasoned that
production employing child labor was itself a "purely local
matter," beyond the competence of Congress-not that such a
matter was beyond the competence of government at any level."'
Further, Justice Holmes, in a dissent that a generation later
9 insisted
would form the basis for the overruling of Dagenhart,"
that established precedent had made it clear that political
branches were free to legislate on the basis of either the moral
values or the prudential judgments of the community. Holmes
explained that
the propriety of the exercise of a power admitted to exist in
some cases was for the consideration of Congress alone and
Id. at 364-65 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
202.
Id. at 365.
203.
204.
Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 317 (1913).
Id. at 322.
205.
Id.
206.
207.
247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
115-17 (1941).
Id. at 276.
208.
209.
See Darby, 312 U.S. at 115-16 (describing Holmes's dissent in Dagenhart as
"powerful and now classic").
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that this Court always had disavowed the right to intrude
its judgment upon questions of policy or morals. It is not for
this Court to pronounce when prohibition is necessary to
regulation if it ever may be necessary-to say that it is
permissible as against strong drink but not as against the
product of ruined lives.21 °
Holmes's analysis presupposes that even the federal
government (and undoubtedly also the States) could legitimately
act for moral purposes-purposes that could not be reduced
merely to questions of policy but that must rely, instead, on
community moral values.2 11
Holmes's view of the scope of the police power became
common currency. Within a generation, the Court could treat it
as unproblematic that even the national legislature "is free to
exclude from [interstate] commerce articles whose use in the
states... it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare."212 There was thus, by the early 1940s, an
agreed understanding as to the existence of both a national and a
local police power that embraced the moral judgments of the
relevant political community. Relying on that understanding, the
Court, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,"3 could
subsequently determine that Congress was entitled to give effect
to the national community's sense of justice in enacting civil
rights legislation: "That Congress was legislating against moral
wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no less
valid. In framing... [the Civil Rights] Act Congress was also
dealing with what it considered a moral problem."214
The States' power of appreciating and relying on the moral
values of the community has also played a role in the Court's
reformulated understanding of the limits of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez," the
Court refused to rely on the so-called "cumulative effects"
principle, which by aggregating the effects of local economic
activity purports to justify a challenged exercise of Congress's
power to regulate "interstate commerce."" 6 The Court

Dagenhart,247 U.S. at 280 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
210.
See id. at 277-78 (framing the issue of the case completely without regard to the
211.
moral purposes of the statute and focusing only on the control of production methods and
excluding the purpose of a statute from judicial consideration of Congress's power to enact
it).
Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.
212.
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
213.
214.
Id. at 257.
215.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Id. at 556-59 (concluding that the appropriate test is "whether the regulated
216.
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characterized the regulation of hand gun possession in school
zones as a noneconomic question and, therefore, not within the
federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.21' And in
215 the Court invalidated a portion of
United States v. Morrison,
the Violence Against Women Act, which created a civil cause of
action against gender-motivated crime. 19 In finding that the
Commerce Clause did not provide Congress the power to
criminalize the behaviors in question, the Court did not consider
violence an economic activity 22° and was unwilling to permit
regulation of a noneconomic activity based on an "aggregate
effect on interstate commerce."22 ' The Morrison Court reasoned
that gender-motivated violence fell within certain core areas that
had been traditionally subject to State rather than federal
Activities in these quintessentially moral
regulation.22
categories---"marriage, divorce, and childrearing"-might well
have cumulative economic impacts on interstate commerce, but
to regulate them at the federal level would eviscerate the
distinction between "what is truly national and what is truly
local." 223 The regulation of the activities falling into these
categories was thus, in the Court's view, inherently a State
power. In light of these cases, the States' police powers may
undoubtedly be exercised on policy or moral grounds, subject to
the limits imposed by constitutional protections of individual
rights.
B. The Police Powers and the FourteenthAmendment's
Privilegesor Immunities Clause
The States' traditional police powers, including the
regulation of morality, have also been delineated and upheld in
the Court's Privileges or Immunities Clause jurisprudence of the
nineteenth century. Under this rubric, we shall discuss Mugler v.
Kansas,224 a case in which the Court upheld a State's power to
enact criminal restrictions on the manufacture and sale of
alcohol.2

activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce").
217.
Id. at 560-61.
218.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
219.
Id. at 601-02, 605.
220.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 617.
221.
Id. at 615-16, 618.
222.
223.
Id. at 615-18.
224.
123 U.S. 623 (1887).
225.
Id. at 657, 662-63.
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In reaching its result, the Court rejected the defendant's
libertarian argument 26 (which is paraphrased in the synopsis to
the reprint of the case in West's Supreme Court Reporter) that
the State had "no power to prohibit any citizen to manufacture
for his own use, or for export, or storage, any article of food or
of
or affecting the rights
drink not endangering
others.... [Under our form of government, the state does not
attempt to control the citizen except as to his conduct to
others."2 7
Speaking through Justice Harlan, the Court found that "the
decisions of this court, rendered before and since the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment," had made clear that the States'
police power extended to statutory regulations designed to
protect or promote morality. 8
To make that demonstration, Justice Harlan quoted
extensively from the opinions of the Justices in the License
Cases.2" Thus, he quoted Justice McLean, who had written there
that "[a] State regulates its domestic commerce, contracts, the
transmission of estates, real and personal, and acts upon all
internal matters which relate to its moral and political
welfare,"2"' and Justice Grier, who had stated that "[w]ithout
attempting to define what are the peculiar subjects or limits of
this [police] power, it may safely be affirmed, that every law for
the restraint and punishment of crime, for the preservation of the
public peace, health, and morals must come within this
category."23 ' Harlan also quoted statements in Beer Co. v.
232 "'[Als a measure of police regulation, looking to
Massachusetts:
the preservation of public morals, a State law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to
any clause of the Constitution of the United States.' 233 He cited
Foster v. Kansas234 for the proposition that States constitutionally

226.
It is interesting to note that the brief for appellant includes a citation to John
Stuart Mill's "On Liberty," perhaps the greatest and most influential defense of
libertarianism ever written. Id. at 632.
227.
Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 288 (1887) (writing in concise form the
arguments of appellant, which appear in their entirety in volume 123 of the U.S. Reports
at 628 to 637 under the heading "Mr. Vest's Argument for Mugler").
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 657.
228.
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
229.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658 (quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 588
230.
(McLean, J.)).
231.
Id. (quoting The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 631 (Grier, J., concurring)).
232.
97 U.S. 25 (1877).
233.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 659 (quoting Beer, 97 U.S. at 33).
234.
112 U.S. 201 (1884).
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have the power to regulate liquor. 35 Harlan concluded that
"[tihese cases rest upon the acknowledged right of the
States ...to protect the health, morals, and safety of their
people., 23" Fortified by these precedents, Justice Harlan then
turned to the appellant's Millian argument and robustly rejected
it:
Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must
exist somewhere; else society will be at the mercy of the
few, who, regarding only their own appetites or passions,
may be willing to imperil the peace and security of the
many, provided only they are permitted to do as they
please. Under our system that power is lodged with the
legislative branch of the government. It belongs to that
department to exert what are known as the police powers of
the State, and to determine, primarily, what measures are
appropriate or needful for the protection 2of
3 7 the public
morals, the public health, or the public safety.
C. Moral Regulation and Substantive Due ProcessDoctrine
Just as the States' right to assert moral grounds as a basis
for legislation under its reserved powers is revealed by negative
inference from the Court's jurisprudence concerning the scope of
enumerated federal powers, so too is that right revealed
inferentially by the Court's substantive due process case law. The
cases are of interest here in two ways. First, in holding that
certain "liberties" are protected against State regulation aimed at
a moral objective, the Court has indicated that other, perhaps

235.
Mugler, 123 U.S. at 659.
236.
Id.
Id. at 660-61. Other courts of about this period were more sympathetic to the
237.
claim that the Constitution effectively embodied and protected a Millian conception of
liberty. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 117 S.W. 383, 386-87 (Ky. 1909), the court,
in voiding a municipal ordinance that forbade the bringing of liquor into a county,
interweaving a long discussion of Mill with the racism characteristic of its time,
concluded:
Under our institutions there is no room for that inquisitorial and protective
spirit which seeks to regulate the conduct of men in matters in themselves
indifferent, and to make them conform to a standard, not of their own
choosing, but the choosing of the lawgiver; that inquisitorial and protective
spirit which seeks to prescribe what a man shall eat and wear, or drink or
think, thus crushing out individuality and insuring Chinese inertia by the
enforcement of the use of the Chinese shoe in the matter of the private
conduct of mankind.
Id.; see also HOWARD MUMFORD JONES, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 48-49 (1953)
(describing the moral justifications for exercises of the police power as part of society's
pursuit of happiness and discussing Mr. Campbell's challenge of the State's alcohol
prohibition as his personal pursuit of happiness, which the Court indulged).
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related, areas of individual conduct are subject to State
regulation on that basis."8 Second and more subtly, in identifying
and characterizing the kinds of conduct that are constitutionally
protected "liberties" not subject to State moral regulation, the
Court has impliedly assumed certain conceptions of "morality."239
The Court's substantive due process jurisprudence has
undergone at least two distinct phases-an earlier phase in
which its understanding of morality is rooted in the experience
and values of the community, and a second phase in which the
Court abandoned a communitarian conception of moral reasoning
and replaced it with libertarian or individualistic ideals.2 40 The

first phase did nothing to impair the notion of the States' police
powers that we have examined above; indeed, the cases in this
group directly or by implication affirm the States' police power to
adopt and enforce traditional community moral standards. 4 ' The
second phase, however, marks the steady contraction of the
States' police power to uphold moral traditions, and, relatedly,
the displacement in the Court's thinking of one conception of
"morality" by another.242
The earlier phase of the Court's substantive due process
precedents recognized a special place for historically accepted
associations and relationships, including marriage and the
family, as the basis for identifying liberty interests protected
24 for
under the Due Process Clause. In Meyer v. Nebraska,
instance, the Court reversed the conviction of a teacher for
teaching German in violation of a State law prohibiting the
teaching of foreign languages to young children.244 Justice
McReynolds's opinion held that, although the State might have
been able to defend its policy of "foster[ing] a homogeneous
people with American ideals" in the immediate wake of World
See, e.g., Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163, 168 (1850) (justifying a State
238.
law prohibiting lotteries-even while recognizing that this law interfered with an
individual's right to contract-because the State's duty to suppress moral nuisances was
paramount).
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (invalidating a
239.
criminal law preventing married couples from obtaining birth-control devices on the
ground that the law invaded a marital "zone of privacy" protected by the Constitution, but
suggesting that less invasive laws to achieve the same purpose would be upheld).
Although the Court's substantive due process decisions have often been
240.
criticized for being extra-textual, scholars have noted that "[t]hrough one device or
another, the Court has always managed to read into the Constitution limits on legislative
power that can hardly be gathered from within that document's four corners." Jed
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1989).
See supra Part IIA-B.
241.
242.
See infra Part III.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
243.
Id. at 396-97, 399, 403.
244.
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War I,245 the statute conflicted "with the power of parents to
control the education of their own." 46 The Court specifically
affirmed that "the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in
order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally,
and morally... but the individual has certain fundamental
rights which must be respected." 24 7 Further, the area of liberty
protected against State regulation, though not "define[d] with
exactness," was at least roughly coextensive with "those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. '' 141 In short, the legal
and cultural tradition embodied in the common law-which
marked out, in the marital union and the family, social spaces
largely immune from governmental intrusion-set limits to State
power.
Shortly thereafter, Pierce v. Society of Sisters4 9 struck down
a State statute requiring children to attend public (rather than
parochial) schools.25 ° Justice McReynolds again located parental
rights in a broader communitarian context, for "[t]he child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 5'
Strikingly,
even
the
Court's
later
contraception
jurisprudence made clear that the Court identified the
substantive personal "liberties" protected by the Due Process
Clause through reference to the dominant, traditional moral
practices and views of the American people. Thus, when the
second Justice Harlan's influential concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut... invoked the methodology of "ordered liberty" to
analyze the State's criminalization of the provision of
contraceptive services to married couples, it emphasized the
social context in which the case arose. 22 Relying on his earlier
dissent in Poe v. Ullman,5 Justice Harlan articulated a vision of
the Court's role in assessing the moral judgments of the State.255
In this view, the Court seeks to balance the legislative power of
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 402.
Id. at 401.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 530, 534-36.
Id. at 535.
381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 500-01.
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the State against the protected liberty of the individual, using
the community's judgment on morality." 6 Harlan's remarks in
Poe deserve to be quoted at length:
It is argued by appellant that the judgment, implicit in
this statute-that the use of contraceptives by married
couples is immoral-is an irrational one, that in effect it
subjects them in a very important matter to the arbitrary
whim of the legislature, and that it does so for no good
purpose.
Yet the very inclusion of the category of morality
among state concerns indicates that society is not limited in
its objects only to the physical well-being of the community,
but has traditionally concerned itself with the moral
soundness of its people as well. Indeed to attempt a line
between public behavior and that which is purely
consensual or solitary would be to withdraw from
community concern a range of subjects with which every
society in civilized times has found it necessary to deal. The
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the
sexual powers may be used and the legal and societal
context in which children are born and brought up, as well
as laws forbidding adultery, fornication and homosexual
practices which express the negative of the proposition,
confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so
deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that
basis.
It is in this area of sexual morality, which contains
many proscriptions of consensual behavior having little or
no direct impact on others, that the State of Connecticut
has expressed its moral judgment that all use of
contraceptives is improper .... Certainly, Connecticut's
judgment is no more demonstrably correct or incorrect than
are the varieties of judgment, expressed in law, on marriage
and divorce, on adult consensual homosexuality, abortion,
and sterilization, or euthanasia and suicide. If we had a
case before us which required us to decide simply, and in
abstraction, whether the moral judgment implicit in the
application of the present statute to married couples was a
sound one, the very controversial nature of these questions
would, I think, require us to hesitate long before concluding

Id. at 501; Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The balance of which I
256.
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.").
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that the Constitution precluded Connecticut from choosing
as it has among these various views.
But... we are not presented simply with this moral
judgment to be passed on as an abstract proposition.257
Harlan did not find the statute unconstitutional because of
its ends-because it was designed to regulate consensual private
conduct in furtherance of the State's moral ideals. 2 " Rather, he
objected to the means that the State had chosen-the machinery
of the criminal law, brought to bear on the marital union." This
he considered an excessive intrusion on marital intimacy within
the privacy of the home. The State had entered into what "by
common understanding throughout the English-speaking world,
aspect
of 'liberty,' the
must be granted to be a most fundamental 26
0
privacy of the home in its most basic sense."
A close reading of the other opinions in Griswold reveals
that other Justices shared Harlan's emphasis on the need to
locate the balance between State interests and individual rights
in the context of the historic practices of the community.2 61
Justice Goldberg's concurrence, though nominally grounded in
the Ninth Amendment, shared Harlan's view on the need to
locate fundamental rights in the historic practices recognized by
the people as a core part of its ethos.262 Similarly, while Justice
Douglas's majority opinion identified the right to "privacy" as an
independent source for constitutional analysis, he too
emphasized the "sacred" character of the historic institution of
marriage as the context for the exercise of the privacy right he
found in the Fourteenth Amendment.2 3
257.
Poe, 361 U.S. at 545-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
258.
Id. at 547-48.
259.
Id.
260.
Id. at 548.
261.
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring) (discussing
Connecticut's asserted interests in sustaining the ban on contraceptives and finding
"nothing in [the] record [to] justifyO the sweeping scope of [the] statute"); see infra note
262 (providing Justice Goldberg's concurrence).
262.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("In determining which
rights are fundamental, judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their
personal and private notions. Rather, they must look to the 'traditions and [collective]
conscience of our people' to determine whether a principle is 'so rooted [there] as to be
ranked as fundamental' ... The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and
to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights
specifically protected.").
263.
Id. at 485-86 ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive
to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship. We deal with a right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights .... Marriage is a coming together for better or for
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While setting limits to the States' powers to legislate for
moral reasons, these substantive due process cases nonetheless
affirmed the relevance and legitimacy of moral traditions in
determining the scope of individual "liberties" protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 64 The limits to the
States' regulatory powers were derived from traditional morality;
only when a State's regulation threatened to encroach on and
injure an established institution or practice like marriage or the
family was it found to have improperly negated "liberty."
Moreover, claims to protected "liberties" were evaluated against
the background of traditional norms and understandings;
"liberty" was not the freedom to engage in radical, innovative,
and counter-cultural experiments in living. Traditional
associations like marriage or the family created zones of privacy
that were to be free of criminal regulation and surveillance by
the States, because State action there was deemed to threaten
the flourishing of a commonly held morality, not to sustain and
uphold it."65 By necessary consequence, if the States did act to the
end of promoting virtue without trespassing into the zones
marked off from regulation, their regulatory activity-as Justice
Harlan clearly implied in Griswold-would presumptively
survive constitutional review.2 66
This historically rooted approach to identifying protected
liberty interests, rather than positing a generalized right to
privacy, was followed as recently as seven years ago in
267 In Glucksberg, the Court rejected a
Washington v. Glucksberg.
substantive due process challenge to State legislation generally
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide.26 The Court began as it
does "in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history,
legal traditions, and practices."2 66 It found that State assistedworse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.").
264.
See supra text accompanying notes 243-248 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) and noting that the State has great liberty to improve the morals of its
citizens).
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (predicting that the Connecticut contraceptive
265.
law would have "maximum destructive impact upon [the marital] relationship" (emphasis
added)).
See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the standard for substantive
266.
due process cases should be whether a statute "violates basic values 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,'" thereby leaving the States free to regulate, substantially as
they pleased, any areas not covered by this pronouncement).
267.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
268. Id. at 735.
269. Id. at 710.

688

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

t42:3

suicide bans, far from being "innovations," were "longstanding
expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and
preservation of all human life."270 Indeed, the Court observed, "for
over 700 years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has
punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting
suicide." 7 1 Even though "the States' assisted-suicide bans have in
recent years been reexamined," they have been "generally,
reaffirmed."272 In summary, the Court found that although
since
"taittitudes toward suicide itself have changed
Bracton,... our laws have consistently condemned, and continue
to prohibit, assisting suicide. 2 73 Turning then from the States'
legal traditions and practices to the "liberties" of the individual,
the Court affirmed, over objection from Justice Souter, the
"restrained methodology" of its usual substantive due process
jurisprudence. 74 On that approach, "the outlines of the 'liberty'
specially protected by the Fourteenth Amendment... [must be]
carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental
rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition."2 75 Only if
the "challenged state action implicated a fundamental right,"
would its defense require a showing of more than a "reasonable
relation to a legitimate state interest."2 76 The asserted right to
die-including the "'right' to assistance in committing suicide"-was not, however, constitutionally "fundamental."2 77 Far from
being rooted in the Nation's history and practices, it stood
against "a consistent and almost universal tradition" of
lawmaking.7 8
Moreover, the Court rejected the challengers' appeal to a
purported "general tradition of 'self-sovereignty' found embodied
in "the broad, individualistic principles" of the Court's recent
"liberty jurisprudence." 279 Rather than accepting the invitation to
place its liberty jurisprudence on a radically individualistic and
libertarian foundation, the Court sought to rein in the broad
implications of its reasoning in Casey, insisting (more than a
little disingenuously) that Casey's affirmation of the right to
abortion announced in Roe merely concerned one of "those
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

711.
716.
719.
721-22.
722.
728.
723.
724, 728.
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personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified
as... deeply rooted in our history and traditions, or [as]
280
fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty."

"That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the
sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and
personal decisions are so protected ... .""'
The controlling standard of review in Glucksberg, therefore,
was merely whether the challenged statute had a rational
relationship to legitimate State interests.282 In identifying those
interests, the Court clearly accepted that the State could
legitimately act to advance a "symbolic and aspirational as well
as practical" interest in the preservation of human life. 83 In
particular, the State could legitimately "'decline to make
judgments about the "quality" of life.""'28 For example, the State
could use the criminal law for the moral and educative purpose of
affirming the value of all human life, including that of the
terminally ill.
Even if Glucksberg now seems plainly out of alignment with
the Court's latter-day substantive due process case law,285 it
stands as a recent affirmation of the States' power to legislate,
protect, and uphold a moral tradition, even in the face of the
claim that that tradition restricts the radical autonomy of
individuals to decide the fates of their own bodies. In the broader
historical perspective, it is the cases discussed below in Part III,
rather than Glucksberg, that seem to be aberrational. Glucksberg
preserves the Central Tradition's view of the States as moral

280.
Id. at 726-27.
281.
Id. at 727. In the equal protection companion case to Glucksberg, the Court also
relied on common law and custom to distinguish between a decision to refuse lifesustaining treatment and an assisted suicide. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-08
(1997) (noting the "well-established, traditional rights to bodily integrity and freedom
from unwanted touching" that form the basis of the right to refuse treatment). Justice
Stevens noted in his concurrence in Glucksberg that the majority left open "the possibility
that some applications of the New York statute may impose an intolerable intrusion on
the patient's freedom." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 751-52 (Stevens, J., concurring). Agreeing
with Justice Stevens's assertion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Vacco, held open the
possibility of as-applied challenges, but on a severely limited basis. See Vacco, 521 U.S. at
809 n.13.
282.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728.
283.
Id. at 728-29.
284.
Id. at 729-30 (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282
(1990)).
285.
It did not seem so to some legal scholars at the time. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, The Right To Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665,
669-72 (finding the reasoning of the Court to be in line with earlier cases).
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communities, empowered to legislate so as to enforce the common
ethos of their people.
III. THE NEW LIBERTARIAN COURT
With the notable exception of Glucksberg, the Court's
individual rights jurisprudence has moved away in recent years
from recognizing the beliefs and practices of the community as
sources of normativity and value and as a legitimate basis for
legislation. Instead the Court, retracing the arguments of the
nineteenth century, seems inclined now to take the path that it
had earlier rejected, and to constitutionalize much of John Stuart
Mill's libertarianism.
This Part will identify two crucial shifts in the Court's
understanding of the nature of individual rights, leading its
jurisprudence to a radical rejection of history and experience as a
source of moral value. The first involves a reduction in the power
of the State to base its decisions on the moral values of the
community, as evidenced in its traditions. The second involves an
increased deference by the Court, not to the political branches,
but rather to 6lite institutions and decisionmakers. The first limb
of the argument involves an examination of the Court's decision
in the sodomy case, Lawrence v. Texas;28 the second limb involves
not only Lawrence but also the Court's affirmative action
28
decisions in Grutterv. Bollinger28 7 and Gratz v. Bollinger.
A. Silencing the States on Questions of Morality
The Court's reasoning in Lawrence, rejecting the community
or traditional view of morality as a basis for legislation,289 follows
directly from libertarian principles articulated in its other recent
precedents. It is no less revolutionary for that. The master
premise in all these libertarian decisions is the view that how one
finds meaning in the universe is, in considerable part, bound up
with the role of joy and suffering, pain and pleasure in one's own
life. 2 ° The individual is to determine his or her conception of

286.
123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
287.
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
288.
123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
289.
123 S. Ct. at 2383-84.
290.
This assumption may derive from the existential philosophy that informed the
thinking of the generation that followed the exposure of the Nazi concentration camps.
See, e.g., VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN'S SEARCH FOR MEANING: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LOGOTHERAPY 178, 183 (Wash. Square Press ed., 1968) (1959) (arguing that the key to
emotional and spiritual well-being is one's interior attitude towards suffering, even in the
face of concentration camp torture). More generally, the Court's master premise in these
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meaning, and it is therefore for him or her alone to decide what
attitude to adopt towards, and what meaning to confer on, the
pain, deprivation and suffering that are necessarily incident to
that individual's life. The State, as a moral community, therefore
cannot impose on individuals a collective or social conception of
the significance of pain, or require unwilling individuals to
undergo a deprivation that they would consider meaningless and
without value.291
Thus, the joint opinion in Casey, arguing in support of the
conclusion that a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy is a
protected liberty, focuses on the place of unwanted pain in the
woman's conception of a meaningful life:
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State
is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because
the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who
to
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties,
S
292
physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear.
And again,
[Rleasonable people will have differences of opinion about
[abortion]. One view is based on such reverence for the
wonder of creation that any pregnancy ought to be
welcomed and carried to full term no matter how difficult it
will be to provide for the child and ensure its well-being.
Another is that the inability to provide for the nurture and
care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to
individual liberty cases tracks changes in the general culture that have been at work
since the 1950s. "[Tihe 'pursuit of (individual) happiness' took on a new meaning in the
postwar period," so that it was no longer "inscribed within certain taken-for-granted
boundaries" set originally by "the citizen ethic, centered on the good of self-rule," as well
as by "certain basic demands of sexual morality... [and] the values of hard work and
productivity, which gave a framework to the pursuit of individual good." CHARLES
TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF RELIGION TODAY: WILLIAM JAMES REVISITED 90-91 (2002); see also
CHARLES GUIGNON, ON BEING AUTHENTIC 46 (2004) (noting the long-term secular
"transformations that [have] occur[red] in the concept of happiness.., from the
eighteenth-century ideal of serene contentment in the bosom of one's family to the
twentieth-century notion of happiness as a pleasurable feeling.... no matter what the

cause of that feeling might be"). However one evaluates these cultural transformations, it
is not clear why they should serve to provide the ruling principle in constitutional
analysis.
291. For a probing critique of the view that the States may not interfere with the
activity of personal self-definition and an explanation of the conceptual linkage between
that view and Millian libertarianism, see Rubenfeld, supranote 240, at 754-61 (analyzing
the "personhood" or "self-definition" basis for the constitutional right to privacy and
arguing that the privacy right cannot be based on the Millian notion of restricting
personal liberty only when one's actions infringe on the liberty of others because
controversial personal actions always have some effect on society at large).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
292.
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It was this dimension of personal liberty that Roe
sought to protect ... 293
The liberty Casey protects is thus the freedom to reject the
"anxieties," "physical constraints," and "pain" incident to
pregnancy, and to a lesser extent the "cruelty to the child" and
"anguish to the parent" that could result from being forced to
bear a child.294 The logic of the Casey joint opinion leads
inexorably to Justice O'Connor's Glucksberg concurrence, in
which she reserved the question of whether there might be a
constitutional right to avoid pain at the time of death through
physician assisted suicide.29 5 Seen in this light, Casey, like Roe,
appears to embody "a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal
autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases
power to mandate medical
recognizing limits on governmental
296
treatment or to bar its rejection."
Lawrence flows readily from Casey. If the freedom of the
individual to frame a conception of meaning shields from State
regulation his or her decisions to avoid "meaningless" pain,
anguish, or deprivation, it should equally protect the individual's
pursuit of those pleasures that he or she finds to be the
constituent elements of a meaningful life. In other words, if the
right to decide whether or not to accept meaningless pain is a
liberty interest worthy of constitutional protection, surely the
right to receive or give pleasure is equally a part of protected
individual liberty. Certainly, sexual activity-whether narrowly
understood as a mere physical act, or more broadly taken as an
intimate association with another human being-is the most
intense form of pleasure within the common experience of most
persons. As such, sexual activity will form a central element in
most individuals' conceptions of meaning and value. Surely, then,
"the right to define one's own concept ...of meaning," as
enunciated in the joint opinion in Casey, must include the right
to decide to engage in activities that produce sexual pleasure.297

Id. at 853.
293.
294.
Id. at 852-53.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
295.
concurring).
296.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 857.
297. Id. at 851. For a critique of the idea that "homosexual identity" is essential to
the self-identity of those who practice homosexual acts, see Rubenfeld, supra note 240, at
779-80. Standing views like Justice Kennedy's on their head, Rubenfeld argues that
[I]n the very concept of a homosexual identity there is something potentially
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Lawrence makes clear that "the right to define one's own
concept... of meaning" is so central an individual right that it is
now outside the ken of social construction and, therefore, of State
regulatory power.2 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Lawrence
Court, stated baldly that, for purposes of substantive due process
analysis, "[tihe Texas statute furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and
private life of the individual."29 9 Driving the point home, Justice
Kennedy also cited Justice Stevens's sweeping view, in his
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, that "'the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice."' '0 Justice O'Connor, concurring in the
judgment, asserted that, for purposes of an equal protection
analysis of the distinction the State drew between heterosexual
and homosexual sodomy, "[i]oral disapproval of this
[homosexual] group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under
the Equal Protection Clause."'' Drawing on the (implicit)
reasoning underlying Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in
Romer v. Evans, °2 Justice O'Connor went on to say that "we have
never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted
state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection
Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of
persons."3 3 Thus, both Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court on
substantive due process grounds and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence on equal protection grounds share the premise that
enforcement of the moral values of the community cannot extend

disserving-if not disrespectful-to the cause advocated.
... [Tihe idea of a "homosexual identity" has its origin in precisely the kind
of invidious classification described earlier. Homosexuality is first understood as
a central, definitive element of a person's identity only from the viewpoint of its
"deviancy."

Id.
298.

Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at

851).
299. Id. at 2484.
300.
Id. at 2483 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
301.
Id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634-35 (1996)). Justice O'Connor's notion that the Texas legislation is caste-based rather
than act-based is flatly mistaken. The statute condemned a specific homosexual act, not
the "group" of homosexuals as such. The State's effort to introduce a degree of accuracy
into Justice O'Connor's analysis was unavailing. Id. at 2486-87.
517 U.S. at 635-36.
302.
303.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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to regulating the individual's pursuit of certain forms of pleasure
or the avoidance of certain forms of pain. These activities are now
matters that constitutional law has reassigned from the political
selfindividual
to
unfettered
authority
community's
determination. Defining meaning is now, constitutionally, a
solitary act, not a project to be undertaken through public
reflection and collective choice.
The Court's decision in Lawrence, as indeed in Casey, is not
(or not only) a shift in the locus of decisionmaking authority from
the community to the individual. It is more revealing to say that
it bleeds power out of the political order so as to serve the
economic. In the categories we have been using, it represents a
decisive move in restructuring the Constitution to fit the
demands of an emerging Market State.
First, Lawrence furthers the deconstruction of the States as
moral communities, capable of legislating in ways that might
inhibit the functioning of markets for the sake of higher-order
collective values. More specifically, Lawrence diminishes the
States' ability to use criminal law to serve expressive and
educative purposes, tending therefore to restrict criminal law to
purely instrumental uses. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
particular goes so far as to imply that a communally deliberated
judgment on moral worth, as codified in the criminal law, cannot
be distinguished from "a bare desire to harm" the group whose
activities the law condemns. The possibility of achieving and
enforcing a collective moral judgment through the criminal law is
thus collapsed into the expression of crude majoritarian
repugnance or distaste. As Justice Scalia provocatively put it in
his Romer dissent, "[tihe Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for
a fit of spite.""
Second, Lawrence promotes the "mainstreaming" of
homosexuals, a group that in the past has suffered from private
discrimination in the marketplace," °' but that may now be
perceived to bring certain competitive advantages to it.
Homosexual employees may, for example, be able or willing to
work longer hours than married heterosexuals with families;
may be more open to relocating as corporate needs require; may
not be as likely to sacrifice career goals to child-bearing or child-

304.
517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra note 76.
305.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482 (reasoning that the criminalization of
homosexual conduct "is an invitation... to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres"); see also id. at 2485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (contending that the
effect of the sodomy law is to "brand[] all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it
more difficult for [them] to be treated in the same manner as everyone else").
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rearing; may require a lower level of health care benefits
(because of fewer partners or dependents); may be drawn to
employment opportunities in more dynamic or "creative" parts of
the economy, such as technology or entertainment; or may find
more welcoming employers in those cutting edge sectors. 6 Casey
hinted at similar market-linked arguments for the permissiveabortion regime instituted by Roe:
[F]or two decades of economic and social developments,
people have organized intimate relationships and made
choices that define their views of themselves and their
places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion
in the event that contraception should fail. The ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control
their reproductive lives. 0 7
While characterizing its jurisprudence in the rhetoric of
freedom and equality, the Court in fact casts a cold eye on the
consequences of its decisions for the market economy.
Third, Lawrence helps to constitute the legal framework for
a system in which individuals do not seek and find meaning,
value, and satisfaction in collective political action or in the
public affirmation of common identities and purposes, but find
their rewards instead in purely private, nonpolitical pleasures
and gratifications. Lawrence thus marks a further step in the
direction of the overall depoliticization of society, and the
devaluation of the citizenship-fundamental
consequent
characteristics of the Nation State.3 s
306. All of these possibilities are conjectural. Nonetheless, there is a common,
perhaps prevalent, perception that homosexuals constitute a particularly affluent, welleducated, and technologically-friendly demographic. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who
Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious
Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1994) (gathering empirical data to support
findings of homosexual affluence); Vilma Barr, Coming Out to Shop: Gay and Lesbian
Consumers Are a New Driving Force in the Marketplace, DISPLAY & DESIGN IDEAS, Nov. 1,
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 16779297 (reporting that 27% of same-sex households
have an annual income of $100,000 or more; that 37% of homosexuals are college
graduates and that 19% have postgraduate degrees; that the average same-sex household
annual income of $61,000 is 8% higher than the average heterosexual annual household
income of $56,000; that over 50% of homosexuals own their own homes; and that 31%
have Internet broadband connections at home). Same-sex households are also
disproportionately found in economically dynamic urban settings throughout the country,
including San Francisco, Seattle, Berkeley, Atlanta, and Washington, D.C. Barr, supra;
see also RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS: AND How IT'S
TRANSFORMING WORK, LEISURE, COMMUNITY, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 255-58 (2002) (finding

high concentrations of homosexuals in high-tech areas).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
307.
308.
On the causes and effects of depoliticization, see CARL BOGGS, THE END OF
POLITICS: CORPORATE POWER AND THE DECLINE OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE 25, 30 (2000)
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The future trajectory of the Lawrence opinion is of course
unforeseeable, but we think that there is no defensible basis to
limit its holding to criminal laws condemning homosexual
sodomy. Although Lawrence speaks (on occasion) of the special
constitutional place of the home, an individual may well have a
constitutionally protected legitimate expectation of sexual
privacy in many other locations. 9 Moreover, although the
Lawrence Court refers to intimate personal relationships,3 1 ° there
is no intelligible basis for limiting the holding to acts that occur
within durable and longstanding homosexual relationships, as
opposed to casual or anonymous acts of sodomy. Indeed, the
rationale of Lawrence arguably extends to all modes of sexual
pleasure, including those involving relations with animals or any
genetically-created beings the Blade Runner" world of
biotechnology may yet fashion for human use and gratification.
The capacity to decide questions of meaning and value on the
basis of one's personal pain or pleasure knows no principled
bounds, for a constitutional libertarian, until another
(constitutional) person is "harmed."
The values of such an extreme libertarianism are, of course,
unrooted in the history and traditions of the Nation, and are
furthermore at odds with the Court's own traditional
understanding of American federalism. They are, therefore,
highly problematic to justify in terms of original understanding,
constitutional text or structure, or judicial precedent. In trying to
sustain its innovations, the Court reasons in a characteristically

(asserting that paltry public participation in government, as evidenced by low voter
turnout, points to a more general depoliticization and devaluation of the individual citizen
in the eyes of the governing 6lite).
309.
Thus, at one place, Justice Kennedy states that the laws at issue in Lawrence
and in Bowers "have more far-reaching consequences [than prohibiting a particular act],
touching upon the most private of human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most
private of places, the home." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. Earlier in the opinion,
however, he had recognized that "there are other spheres of our lives and existence,
outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant presence." Id. at 2475.
Logically, nothing in the opinion restricts it either to sodomy practiced in the home or to
sodomy practiced as part of an intimate personal relationship. After all, the Court has
elsewhere found that there can be a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
[Fourth Amendment] privacy" in a public phone booth. See Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
310.
Justice Kennedy remarked, platitudinously, that "[wihen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element
in a personal bond that is more enduring." Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478. But of course the
"bond" may also be no more substantial than a fleeting encounter.
311.
BLADE RUNNER (Blade Runner Partnership and The Ladd Company 1982) (a
Ridley Scott film in which genetically engineered human "replicants" are used to colonize
other worlds and perform labor that is either too dangerous or too demanding for
humans).
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"pragmatic" fashion:
It functions
as a self-conscious,
for legitimacy on
relying
the
government,
organ
of
policymaking
the fact that its choices serve the (purportedly) emergent needs of
the Nation in international competition and accord with the
outcomes demanded by 61ite domestic and international opinion.
B. The Court'sDeference to Elite Groups and Institutions
A common theme in recent decisions of the Court is the clear
appeal to the views of 61ite groups and institutions. In Lawrence
and, when identifying legitimate State interests for purposes of
equal protection analysis, in Grutter, the Court's deference to the
concerns of economic, political, and cultural 6lites suggests that a
pattern is at work in which community morality is subordinated
to the wishes of the "winners" in the emerging Market State.3 1
Justice Kennedy's reasoning in Lawrence is striking for the
use it makes of 61ite opinion in deciding a question that was
properly never before the Court. Ordinarily, substantive due
process jurisprudence relies on American history and tradition to
substantiate the claim that a fundamental right is at stake, thus
triggering a requirement for special justification of the State's
need to limit the exercise of that right.3 13 Justice Kennedy's use of
history in Lawrence neither established, nor claimed to establish,
the conclusion that homosexual sodomy was recognized at any
point in time by American society as within the sphere of
protected individual liberty. 4 Rather, attempting to refute the
interpretation of history reflected in Bowers v. Hardwick,"5
Justice Kennedy argued that the historical record did not
demonstrate that the coercive power of the State had been
directed at homosexual activity." 6 In other words, he shifted the
burden of persuasion so as to require the State defendant to
demonstrate historically that its interest in the regulation of
particular sexual conduct had been traditionally asserted and
312.

See generally CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE

BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY (1995) (arguing that American 61ites are betraying democracy
and embracing global economy as panacea).
313.
See supra text accompanying notes 261-276.
314.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80 (concluding that prior to the 1970s criminal
sodomy statutes sought to prohibit "nonprocreative sexual activity more generally" (as
opposed to homosexual conduct) but never asserting a general acceptance of homosexual
practice).
315.
478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (finding no historical evidence of a liberty right to
engage in consensual homosexual sodomy); id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(underscoring his "view that in constitutional terms there is no such thing as a
fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy.... [and that] proscriptions against
sodomy have very 'ancient roots'").
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-80.
316.

698

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[42:3

accepted. The key materials for the conclusion that the States
had never relied on the community's conception of morality to
justify the prohibition of homosexual activity was the nearly
Kennedy's view, of the professional
unanimous verdict, in31Justice
7
historical community.
Justice Kennedy in Lawrence also relied on another segment
international
legal
community's
of 61ite
opinion-the
understanding of homosexual rights.3 1 s While some early
Supreme Court precedent had alluded to the possibility that
identifying a violation of a constitutionally protected "liberty"
might require the Court to explore conceptions of justice
prevailing outside the United States, 319 recent efforts to rely on
foreign precedent to inform American conceptions of substantive
due process have been met with failure. 2 ° In Lawrence, however,
Justice Kennedy relied expressly on the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights to determine that several
European nations held views "at odds with the premise in Bowers
that the [liberty] claim
put forward was insubstantial in our
321
civilization."
Western
Even more telling than its use of dlite opinion in Lawrence
was the Court's unembarrassed reliance on 6lite views to
determine the scope of a highly contested constitutional
antidiscrimination norm in Grutter. Relying extensively on
amicus briefs submitted by 61ite corporate, military, and
educational authorities, Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, asserted the following:
[MiajorAmerican businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only
be developed though exposure to widely diverse people,
317.
See id. (relying on submissions by the libertarian Cato Institute and the
"Professors of History, et al."); see also Rick Perlstein, Op-Ed, What Gay Studies Taught
the Court, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B3 (noting the Court's reliance on an amicus
brief submitted by a coalition of history professors, some of whose work had until recently
been derided as reflecting marginal scholarship representing the politically correct values
of academic 61ites).
318.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480-81 (referencing the Wolfenden Reportadvising the British Parliament to repeal laws against homosexual conduct-and the
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 52 (1981)-holding that laws proscribing homosexual conduct are
"invalid under the European Convention on Human Rights").
319.
See, e.g., Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1884) (stating that
"[tihere is nothing in Magna Charta... [that] ought to exclude the best ideas of all
systems and of every age").
320.
See, e.g., Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2494-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting in his
dissenting opinion that foreign views are "meaningless dicta").
321.
Id. at 2481, 2482-83 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 52 (1981), a case interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights).
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cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking
retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States
military assert that, "[based on [their] decades of
experience," a "highly qualified, racially diverse officer
corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security." The primary
sources for the Nation's officer corps are the service
academies and the Reserve Officers Training Corps
(ROTC), the latter comprising students already admitted to
participating colleges and universities. At present, "the
military cannot achieve an officer corps that is both highly
qualified and racially diverse unless the service academies
and the ROTC used limited race-conscious recruiting and
admissions policies."

Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our
Nation's leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy
roughly half the state governorships, more than half the
seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of
the seats in the United States House of Representatives.
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in
the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness
and integrity of the educational institutions that provide
this training. 2
In short, the Court based its constitutional reasoning on the
contention of a group of the Nation's key corporate, political, and
military leaders that the Nation's prospects of success in the face
of international strategic threats, as well as the continued
stability and perceived legitimacy of its domestic political
institutions, required racial preferences in 6lite formation
through our major educational institutions.
Fascinating as it is for what it says, the Grutter opinion is
perhaps still more fascinating for what it does not say. Faced
with the highly charged question of the constitutionality of racial
preferences in public higher education-which it had not
addressed since the split Bakke323 decision of 1978-the Court
could have rested its approval of such preferences on the
322.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339-41 (2003) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
323.

700

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[42:3

squarely moral grounds that the State had a compelling interest
in overcoming and remediating the effects of past discriminatory
practices. In other words, the Court might have seen the State's
action as permitted, or even required, by the demands of
corrective justice. Instead, the Court chose to rest on purely
amoral, instrumentalist grounds3 2 4-thus evidencing its aversion
to the public invocation of a presumptively common or shared
morality, not only by the Nation's legislatures, but also by its
courts .325

But was a corrective justice rationale available to the Court,
even given the longstanding exclusion of minority groups from
American leadership cadres? The Court's own affirmative action
precedents admittedly tended to block reliance on any such
rationale, insofar as they held that governmental racial
preferences could be justified as remediation only if they were
carefully crafted to redress particularized wrongs committed by
the State against specified groups.3 2' Accordingly, the State
tactically eschewed reliance on a remediation theory, arguing
instead that it had sought merely to promote educational
But another body of precedents-the Court's
diversity.'
desegregation cases-had recognized that measures to eliminate
racial discrimination and its lingering effects had a
fundamentally moral basis.32 At any rate, no remedial rationale
ever surfaced in Grutter; the keynote of the opinion was diversity,
not corrective justice."9

324.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (justifying the Court's finding of a compelling
interest in attaining a diverse student body on the ground that diversity is necessary "to
cultivate a set of leaders" who can compete in the global marketplace and be seen as
'legitima[te] in the eyes of the citizenry").
325.
On the other hand, the Court was not so openly cynical as to declare the State's
policy constitutionally valid because, by providing cosmetic relief from the Nation's stillfestering racial wounds, it could serve to palliate the grievances of minorities and so bind
them to an 6lite leadership that, for the foreseeable future, would remain
disproportionately drawn from other races.
326.
See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989) ("In sum,
none of the evidence presented by the city points to any identified discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry. We, therefore, hold that the city has failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the
basis of race.").
327.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332 (describing the law school's diversity policy as
"aspir[ing] to 'achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's
education").
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
328.
BICKEL, supra note 108, at 133: "discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society'").
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338-40 (accepting the law school's goal of enrolling a
329.
diverse class of students as a "compelling interest").
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Diversity, unlike corrective justice, supposes that the
legitimate interests of a State in this area are grounded in purely
pragmatic, nonmoral goals. The demographic diversity of the
leadership class, unlike whether the composition of that class
reflects a just society, is an issue that can be considered without
appeal to values and norms that, even if widely shared, could
prove to be divisive and contentious. As one sympathetic
commentator put it, Grutter "places us in the Here and Now,"
rather than "look[ing] back to... slavery and Jim Crow."33 ° But
as a more critical view of "diversity" notes,
Diversity is particularly appealing because of what it
is not. It is not based on theories of racial responsibility. It
is not based on a vision of group rights, or on a theory that
proportional racial representation is an end in itself. It is
not based on controversial views of compensation for past
discrimination .... It does not even require a social
consensus about the magnitude of present discrimination.332
The reasoning in Grutter, therefore, brackets the question of
the morality of race-conscious admissions programs-with the
apparent but incongruous consequence that acting upon the
morality of such measures is not within the domain of legitimate
State interests.
At the same time, the Grutter Court did not disclose what
conceivably was, from a more purely instrumentalist perspective,
the full measure of its thought. It can be argued with
considerable plausibility that the workings of majoritarian
democracy-unless effectively constrained by constitutional
protections for propertied minorities-will tend to reverse the
outcomes produced by markets, in that the markets will normally
tend to favor identifiable ethnic minorities. 3 2 This apparently
inescapable tension between democracy and markets can exist,
moreover, not only in developing nations, but also in the United
States. Left to its own devices and without some form of
governmental intervention, American capitalism seems likely to
Kenneth L. Karst, The Revival of Forward-Looking Affirmative Action, 104
330.
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 69 (2004) (noting that the Grutter decision does not use the effects of
past discrimination as a justification for the present use of affirmative action, but rather
seeks to use affirmative action to address current problems involving racial relations
while ignoring the historic causes of those problems).
Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L.
331.
REV. 2059, 2059 (1996) (criticizing the diversity approach to affirmative action as contrary
to the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act, which require that a person's
race not be considered as a potentially deciding factor in hiring or admissions decisions).
332.

See AmY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: HOW EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY

BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 3, 6 (2003) (providing examples of
Chinese minorities in the Philippines and Indonesia).
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continue to favor and reward certain identifiable ethnic and
racial groups disproportionately and to disfavor other identifiable
groups. Particularly given the sources of much of this inequality
in the nation's history of slavery and discrimination, the
persistence (and possible aggravation) of such differences would
tend to create sharp and destabilizing conflicts within the
American polity. American economic, political, and military 6lites
have a clear interest in abating or suppressing such conflicts.
Indeed, they must do so if the American Market State is to
remain competitive in the international arena.
The Grutter decision can thus be seen as the Court's
ratification (in the guise of constitutional adjudication) of the
opinion of the dominant 6lites on how best to address this
troubling prospect. The solution preferred by 6lites surely cannot
be to redress the full costs of slavery and discrimination by largescale compensatory measures. As well as being (arguably)
unaffordable, the political efforts required to enact and execute
such a program could be even more divisive and destabilizing (at
least in the short term) than the inequalities it was designed to
eliminate.
More attractive is the kind of cosmetic solution pursued by
the State in Grutter and upheld, at the behest of 6lite
decisionmakers, by the Court. Selection for 6lites through modest
governmental interventions in the admissions process for public,
professional schools would be virtually cost-free to existing 6lites
(if much more so to non~lite whites and Asians). At the same
time, it would ensure over time such a visible (if perhaps also
small) presence of minorities within 61ite ranks that the great
majority of the minority population would be led to accept the
continuing legitimacy of the 6lite's national leadership.
Michigan's program was constitutionally valid because it would
"cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the
[minority] citizenry."3 33 From an 6lite perspective, the optics-not
the reality-of racial equality is what mattered. Social peace
could be bought at a low price and without fundamentally
disturbing the existing structures of hierarchy.3 34
Grutter reflects the Court's deference to 6lite concerns in yet
another way: not so much in forming a national 6lite that
possesses "legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry" as in meeting

333.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341.
334.
As Bobbitt argues, affirmative action, though purporting to promote the
equality of "the group that is thought to be in need of assistance," in fact entrenches the
hitherto-dominant group's power to "set[] the terms of assimilation," which "implicitly
den[ies] equal status" to the assisted group. BOBBIT'I, supra note 22, at 225.
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the business needs created by competition in "today's
increasingly global marketplace." 335 The Court seems to have
accepted the dlite judgment that in order to remain vigorously
competitive in the international arena, American business must
select its leadership cadres from the entire range of racial and
ethnic backgrounds found within the Nation's population, so that
the increased diversity within those cadres would at least
roughly match the diverse population of the "global marketplace"
at large.336 lite formation would still be conducted in terms of
"merit"-based selection principles, but "merit" would now be
defined in terms of a competitive advantage in an expanded,
more thoroughly globalized, market. 33 ' Thus, affirmation action,
understood and applied in this manner, has fundamentally
different goals from the Court's Cold War-era project of
desegregation. Desegregation served the needs of a Nation State
that was attempting to be "the provider and guarantor of
[individual] equality."338 In large part, desegregation was an
effort to assimilate minorities into the dominant national group,
thus forging a national people that could meet the external
Communist enemy with a united front, and so denying that
enemy any opportunity to exploit potentially dangerous rifts
within the Nation. Affirmative action, as upheld in Grutter, is
also thought to serve the Nation's strategic needs, but in an
international environment that is markedly different from the
Cold War.339 No longer does the Court feel a need to foster a
national unity that transcends racial consciousness or to further
the assimilation of racial minorities . Such strategic needs have
335.
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
336.
See id. at 2340 (citing amicus briefs from 3M and General Motors to emphasize
that the skills needed to compete in the "global marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints").
337.
At the same time, the Court was unwilling to depart too far from more
traditional criteria of "merit." As Justice Thomas trenchantly pointed out, the Court
refused to require the State's law school to consider race-neutral selection schemes that
would have produced the same amount of "diversity" as before, while also relaxing the
school's demanding academic requirements for admission. See Lund, supra note 138, at
281-82 (citing Justice Thomas's dissent, which argued that the Grutter majority's refusal
to require Michigan Law School to consider race-neutral methods was in direct contrast to
the Court's opinion in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)).
338.
BOBBIr, supra note 22, at 225.
339.
See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (recognizing the opinions of military leaders that
a "'highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ...is essential to the military's ability to
fulfill its principle mission to provide national security").
340.
In a line of cases beginning in 1976, the Court has disapproved lower court
decisions to prevent resegregation and has sought to facilitate the transition of public
school districts to "unitary" status, See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)
(holding that federal courts may relinquish supervision and control of school districts in
incremental phases); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991) (stating that the
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passed, together with the passing of the Cold War's chief external
threat. Thus the Grutter Court could view the prospect of
multiculturalism with equanimity despite the fact that, as
makes it
multiculturalism
perceives,
Bobbitt correctly
"increasingly difficult" for a Nation State "to get consensus on
public-order problems and the maintenance of rule-based legal
action."3 4' Rather than regarding the rise of multiculturalism as a
liability that had the potential to weaken or even fracture the
Nation, the Court saw it as an asset to be exploited for all the
advantages it could bring American businesses in their
race-conscious
again,
And
transactions. 342
international
governmental action is viewed through the prism of its
usefulness, not its morality.
In what follows, we build on this analysis of the Court's
decisions, including both its rejection of the legitimacy of the
States' enforcement of traditional morality and its "pragmatic"
deference to 6lite opinion. Both of these aspects of the Court's
jurisprudence follow from its commitment to reorder the
Constitution to adapt to the needs of the Market State. Part IV
applies the same kind of analysis to the Court's federalism
jurisprudence. In particular, the Court's reasoning in American
343 follows directly from the
Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi
individual rights doctrines discussed here in Part III.
IV. THE NEW FEDERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CASES

Before situating Garamendi in the context of the Court's
recent individual rights jurisprudence, three other trends of
thought, which have long been at work influencing the
development of the Court's theory of federalism, must be
discussed.

district could achieve unitary status if it showed that it was compliant with equal
protection norms and was unlikely to revert to segregative practices); Pasadena City Bd.
of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976) (disapproving lower court order
requiring annual readjustment of school boundaries). That is not to say, of course, that
the Court has abandoned all interest in seeking to promote racial integration, and other
cases evince its continuing support of that ideal. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
433 (1984) (refusing to allow racial biases to influence the "removal of an infant child from
the custody of its natural mother"). But it also seems reasonable to say that the Court is
untroubled by the prospect of multiculturalism, with all that that may mean for
prolonging and reinforcing the sense that racial differences matter.
341.
BOBBITT, supra note 22, at 225.
342. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2340 (commenting that "student body
diversity. . . 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,
and better prepares them as professionals'" who will be ready to enter the "global
marketplace").
343. 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003).
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First, the Court's federalism jurisprudence arguably carries
forward a constitutional revolution initiated by Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins.344 In Erie, the Court rejected the twin assumptions
that federal courts may apply law that does not derive from
either a State or federal sovereign, and that the common law is
discovered rather than made345-thus constitutionalizing legal
positivism.3 46 Erie feeds into the Court's later federalism in at
least two ways: It (1) supports an understanding that the States
are in some respects fully sovereign with reserved spheres of
authority that even the federal sovereign must respect, and,
more importantly here, (2) encourages the view that law is itself
primarily a matter of power relationships, not of objective norms
discoverable by reason and reflection.
Second, many courts have followed Professor Brainerd
Currie's revolutionary work in conflicts of law analysis, 47 which,
in drawing on the legal realist movement, supposed that only a
State's interests in its own domiciliaries, or in conduct on or
affecting its territory, could form the basis of its legislative
jurisdiction. 48 Currie's theory rested on the view that lawmaking

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
344.
345.
See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2762 (2004) (noting that pre-Erie,
the "accepted conception was of the common law as 'a transcendental body of law outside
of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute'"
(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))); id. at 2764 ("[W~e now tend to
understand common law not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a
positivistic way, as a product of human choice."); id. at 2773 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The
Court recognizes that Erie was a 'watershed' decision heralding an avulsive change,
wrought by 'conceptual development in understanding common law... [and accompanied
by an] equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in making it.'"
(alteration in original)); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International
Law in U.S. Courts-Before and After Erie, 26 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 807, 818 (1998)
("[Tihe Court in Erie rejected.., the idea that federal courts can apply law not derived
from a sovereign source, and the idea that courts merely discover the common law rather
than make it.").
But see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal
346.
Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 673, 674 & n.7 (1998) (citing and criticizing extensive academic
commentary arguing that Erie constitutionalized legal positivism).
See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
347.
(1963) (explaining the instrumentalist nature of lawmaking and the territoriality of
Conflict of Law practice). For judicial acknowledgements of Currie's influence, see
Booking v. General Star Management Co., 254 F.3d 414, 422 n.7 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing
Professor Currie as the most influential critic of the traditional "vested rights" theory of
Conflict of Laws), and Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 166 n.63 (3d Cir. 1980)
(referring to Currie as the "father of modern governmental interest analysis").
CURRIE, supra note 347, at 292 (determining that a statute's benefits should "be
348.
applied ...to effectuate [a] community's policy... whenever those who are the objects of
[the statute's] protection are members of the community-i.e., residents or domiciliaries of
the state").
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is to be conceived as a merely instrumental activity. 49 It
intimated a conception of State authority that discounted any
role for pursuing the common good or promoting the virtue of the
individual.35 °
Third, the Court's recent federalism case law has often
focused on reinforcing the process of political competition
between the States and the federal government. Accordingly, the
Court has tended to view federalism as a device for perfecting
political markets, and has sought to ensure that transparency
and accountability facilitate informed choices by political
consumers.35 ' In effect, the Court has treated the State political
process as though it were chiefly a device for preference
satisfaction and welfare maximizing, rather than a means for
achieving individual virtue and the common good.
All three of these trends complement the Court's individual
rights and equal protection jurisprudence surveyed above. The
various strands of thought are knitted together in the Court's
3 5'
"foreign relations federalism" opinion in Garamendi.
In Garamendi, the Court surprised many observers by
holding that California's Holocaust Victims Insurance Relief Act
of 1999 (HVIRA) had been preempted by executive branch policy
reflected in an executive agreement with a foreign government. 5 3
The HVIRA had "require[d] any insurer doing business in
[California] to disclose information about all policies sold in

349.
See Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277,
1284-85 (1989) (conveying Currie's theory that "choice of law... [ius simply a tool to
effectuate state policy").
John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23
350.
WM. & MARY L. REV. 173, 173-80 (1981) (noting that Currie's reliance on territorial
interests, to the abandonment of other considerations, leaves no room for consideration of
the virtue of the individual or for pursuing the common good).
351.
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997) (extending the
reasoning of the legislative anticommandeering principle to a refusal to permit the federal
government to commandeer State executive officials); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 182-83 (1992) (invaliding federal directive to a State ordering the enactment of
particular legislation on the theory that political accountability is a necessary postulate of
federalism, because competition between federal and State policymakers requires that
individual voters be able to assign responsibility for a policy choice to the author of the
policy rather than merely to its agent); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the
regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the
regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and
state authority would blur and political responsibility would become illusory.").
352.
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2386 (2003) (stating that
there is "no question that at some point an exercise of state power that touches on foreign
relations must yield to the National Government's policy").
353.
Id. at 2379 (declaring the preemption).
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Europe between 1920 and 1945." " This regulatory requirement,
the Court said, "threatens to frustrate the operation of the
particular mechanism the President has chosen"35 to vindicate
the interests of the United States in the resolution of Holocaust
5 ' The President's preferred mechanism was a
survivors' claims."
voluntary body, the International Commission on Holocaust Era
Insurance Claims (ICHEIC), established to negotiate and settle
unpaid policies.35 ' The ICHEIC compensation fund for Holocaust
victims was created by the 2000 German Foundation Agreement
between the United States and Germany. 5 In working out this
and related agreements, the United States executive branch did
not stipulate, in terms, that inconsistent State law or policy was
to be superseded; rather, the United States agreed only to "use
its best efforts, in a manner it considers appropriate," to
persuade the States to treat the German Foundation process as
the exclusive method of claim resolution. 59
Federal preemption, therefore, could hardly be found in the
German Agreement itself. Indeed, the language of the Agreement
seemed to imply that the States need not regard the Agreement
as preemptive. As the United States' brief in the court of appeals
stated, it was a mistake "to suggest that the Agreement by its
terms preempts the California statute."6 s Further, the Court did
not find any other related agreements or congressional statutes
ex proprio vigore to preempt3 6 1 the HVIRA. 362 Federal law and
federal treaties, as such, accordingly had nothing directly to do
with the Court's result, and indeed nothing in the text of the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause could be said to specify the
kind of "law" here that trumped a legitimate exercise of State

Id.
354.
Id. at 2392.
355.
356. Id. at 2381-82, 2382 n.2.
357.
Id. at 2382.
358.
See Agreement Concerning the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and
the Future," U.S.-F.R.G., art. 1, §§ 1-4, Annex A, July 17, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1298, 12991303 [hereinafter German Foundation Agreement].
Id. art. 2, § 2.
359.
Brief for Amicus Curiae The United States of America in Support of Affirmance
360.
at 48-49, Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374 (2003) (No. 02-722).
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2388, 2390 (relying on the more general exercise of
361.
executive authority in the area of vindicating U.S. claims, rather than on the specific
executive authority to make treaties).
362. Id. at 2393-94 (rejecting arguments for implicit congressional approval through
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which transferred to States the authority to regulate
business of insurance, or based on the more recent Holocaust Commission Act, which
merely established a Presidential Commission for record collection and did not purport to
approve parallel State efforts to collect records or authorize otherwise unconstitutional
State efforts to collect records).
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legislative jurisdiction.6 3 Moreover, both judicial precedent and
scholarly commentary were distinctly unfavorable to the idea
that mere executive branch policy could have a preemptive effect
on State law: Indeed, "the idea that a presidential policy could, in
itself, displace a state law seemed barely to have been
contemplated."36 4
The Court's conclusion that the executive branch policy,
embodied in the German Foundation Agreement, preempted the
HVIRA depended on resuscitating and refashioning an isolated,
dubious, and over thirty year-old precedent, Zschernig v.
Miller."' Zschernig itself suffered from numerous analytical
deficits6 6 but, in any event, was misused in Garamendi. In brief,
Garamendi read the German Foundation Agreement in
conjunction with Zschernig's doctrine of "'dormant [federal]
foreign affairs preemption,"' a rule of constitutional exclusion
that declares States to be incompetent to affect foreign affairs in
particular ways, such that the Federal Executive's foreign policy
has a preemptive effect on State law." 7
A.

The Pre-GaramendiAllocation of Power Between the States
and the Federal Government in ForeignRelations

Zschernig itself, like Garamendi, had come as something of a
surprise because it invalidated a State statute similar to one that
had previously survived a facial attack in Clark v. Allen.365 Both
Zschernig and Clark had concerned the validity of a State
probate law that restricted the ability of legatees living 36in9
Communist-bloc countries to receive property willed to them.
Commentators and courts have attempted to distinguish the two
cases in terms of the judicial administration of the probate law,
which afforded State judges an occasion for casting aspersions on
363.
See U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 863-64.
364.
365.
389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968) (mentioning the danger of a State's establishing its
own foreign policy).
See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 855-57 (arguing that Zschernig is a
366.
questionable precedent because, under it, "in the absence of a treaty provision, a law, or
even an executive branch policy, a state law may still be" preempted).
See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2400 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2387-91
367.
(majority opinion) (holding that the Government demonstrated a sufficient enough
interest to require a finding of preemption of the State law).
368.
331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947).
369.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430-31 & n.1; Clark, 331 U.S. at 505-06 & n.1.
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the political systems of Communist-bloc countries, thereby
potentially complicating the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. 7 1 If
so, Zschernig might arguably have been best understood as a
federalism-grounded, State-law corollary of Banco Naqional de
3 71 in which the Court, on the basis of general
Cuba v. Sabbatino,
separation-of-powers principles, refused to enforce a State-law
claim grounded on the invalidity of an expropriation of assets in
Cuba by the Cuban revolutionary government.17' The Sabbatino
Court reasoned that a judicial ruling as to whether the Cuban
government's confiscation of property on its own territory
violated international law would undermine the Executive's
conduct of foreign policy in this area, thus transgressing
(prudential) separation of powers limits on judicial authority.73
One might then read Zschernig and Sabbatino together as a
double-barreled effort by the Supreme Court to enable the
political branches of the federal government, without
interference from either the State courts or the federal judiciary,
to manage the Cold War and, perhaps, to seek d6tente in the face
of domestic resistance to any compromises with communism.
The Garamendi Court's reliance on Zschernig was
surprising, not only because the geopolitical circumstances that
may have given rise to Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs
See, e.g., LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
370.
CONSTITUTION 436-37 nn.64-65 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing both cases and reasoning that
the "Oregon [probate] statute introduces the concept of 'confiscation,'" which would be in
conflict with the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment). Similarly, courts
believed the principles underlying the Court's holding in Zschernig to be limited to its
particular fact-pattern, which involved judicial statements critical of a foreign legal
system. See, e.g., Gorun v. Fall, 393 U.S. 398, 398-99 (1969) (indicating that Zschernig
makes clear that "a state probate judge is not authorized to make or apply a probate rule
contrary to... federal policy"); Shames v. Nebraska, 323 F. Supp. 1321, 1326 (D. Neb.
1971), afftd, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (stating that Zschernigrelates only to judicial application
of the statute that can complicate foreign affairs).
371.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).
372.
Id. at 401 (explaining that under the Act of State doctrine, courts may not
challenge the validity of acts of other governments committed within their own borders).
The Court asserted,
373.
There are few if any issues in international law today on which opinion
seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the
property of aliens.
... It is difficult to imagine the courts of this country embarking on
adjudication in an area which touches more sensitively the practical and
ideological goals of the various members of the community of nations.
The dangers of such adjudication are present regardless of whether the
State Department has, as it did in this case, asserted that the relevant act
violated international law.
Id. at 428-32.
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doctrine had long vanished, nor because Zschernig's doctrine had
been searchingly criticized by legal scholars,3 74 but also because
nothing in recent jurisprudence of the Court suggested that
Moreover, the Court's postZschernig might be revived 7
Zschernig cases have not otherwise suggested that bare executive
branch policy could have a preemptive effect on an otherwise
valid State law.376
For example, the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan3 7 relied
on (1) the Algiers Accord, a sole Presidential agreement settling
U.S. claims against the Government of Iran in return for the
repatriation of American hostages and (2) congressional
acquiescence in the longstanding practice of sole executiveclaims-settlement agreements, to trump State-law claims
executive
policy
Unlike
the
contract.3 8
sounding in
the
held
to
preempt
State
law,
pronouncements that Garamendi
pronouncements at issue in Dames & Moore were Presidential
(rather than being authored by lower level Executive officials). 9
Further, unlike Garamendi, the State law at issue in Dames &
Moore was inconsistent with the express terms of the relevant
executive agreement.38 ° Further still, in Barclays Bank PLC v.

See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 88, at 285-88 (arguing that neither the dormant
374.
foreign-affairs-preemption doctrine nor the federal common law of foreign-relations
doctrine is a necessary "reading of the Constitution, federal statutory law, or Supreme
Court precedent"); Ramsey, supra note 60, at 356-57 (opining that the Court's decision in
Zschernig was based on assumptions and intuitions rather than constitutional text or
structure or original intent regarding the powers of States relating to foreign affairs).
See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 88, at 286 (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has
375.
not applied this doctrine in the thirty-three years since Zschernig"). Further, as Justice
Ginsburg noted in her Garamendidissent, the Court had never based another decision on
Zschernig's dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrine. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,
123 S. Ct. 2374, 2400 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She also argued that Zschernig
was readily distinguishable in that it only involved State policies that either criticized
foreign governments or intruded deeply into foreign affairs-neither of which was true of
the HVIRA. Id.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 385 (2000)
376.
(finding both executive opinion and reactions of foreign powers irrelevant to
"congressional intent because Congress had taken specific actions rejecting the positions
both of foreign governments and the Executive" (internal citations omitted)).
377.
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
378.
Id. at 675-83.
379.
Id. at 660.
380.
Id. at 666-67 (discussing Executive Order No. 12294 and its suspension of all
"claims which may be presented to the... Tribunal'" and mandating that any such
claims "shall have no legal effect in any action now pending in any court of the United
States'"). As noted, the documents associated with the German Foundation Agreement
had consciously withheld any declaration of preemptive effect. See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct.
at 2387-88 ("[1]f the agreements here had expressly preempted laws like HVIRA, the
issue would be straightforward.").
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Franchise Tax Board,"8' the Court declined to find that executive
branch policy pronouncements, relevant to the interpretation of
the U.S.-U.K. tax treaty, gave rise to a foreign-affairs preemption
barring California from using the so-called "worldwide combined
reporting" methodology to determine a U.K. firm's corporate
franchise

tax.38 2

Finally,

the

Court's

last

pre-Garamendi

encounter with foreign-relations federalism, Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,"3 did not rely in the least on Zschernig's
doctrine of dormant foreign-affairs preemption." 4 Rather, in
Crosby, the Court found that a Massachusetts ban on certain
State contracts with entities doing business in Burma was
preempted by a federal statute authorizing the President to
impose-or withhold-sanctions against a narrower class of
businesses and investors dealing with Burma.385 The Crosby
Court reasoned that preemption arose because Congress had
manifested its intention to limit sanctions aimed against the
Burmese regime to those which the President deemed necessary
after seeking to coordinate policy with Japan and the European
Union." 6 The federal statute was construed to have given the
President the authority to decide for the Nation as a whole what
types and what level of sanctions (within the limits prescribed by
Congress) were appropriate to achieve the goal of improving
human rights conditions in Burma. 7 The Crosby Court seemed
willing to adopt a strained construction of the federal statute in
order to preempt State law, rather than to make use of
Zschernig's doctrine of dormant federal-foreign-affairs power to
achieve that result.

512 U.S. 298 (1994). Justice Ginsburg's Garamendi dissent relied, as had her
381.
opinion for the Court in Barclays Bank, on the lack of precedent for finding foreign affairs
preemption based on mere sub-cabinet level, executive branch policy statements.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2400-01.
Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 324-31 (noting that this question is best left to
382.
Congress and not to the courts).
530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
383.
See id. at 385-86 (finding that "repeated representations by the Executive
384.
branch supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes" provided evidence
for congressional intent to preempt).
Id. at 366, 376-78 (finding that the State law is in clear conflict with
385.
congressional intent).
That is to say, the Court read the federal statute as enabling the President to
386.
protect the ability of American corporations to do business in Burma, even at a cost to
human rights, if their competitors refused to boycott the Burmese r~gime. Id. at 380-82.
Thus, as a result of Crosby, control over the U.S. sanctions policy towards Burma
effectively lay with Japanese and European multinationals. See id. at 383 & n.19
(revealing that the European Union intended to begin new World Trade Organization
proceedings if the injunction on the State law was lifted).
387.
Id. at 374-77.
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Thus, recent pre-Garamendi precedent had suggested that
foreign-affairs preemption requires either (1) an Act of Congress
that could (more or less plausibly) be read to oust conflicting
State policy, or else (2) some overt act of constitutional authority
by the President-in the form of an executive agreement, ideally
coupled with congressional sanction or ratification (or a pattern
of acquiescence)-whose express terms were clearly at odds with
the State's statute."' In other words, some reasonably explicit
action, transparent to the electorate, would have been required
from one or both of the federal political branches, operating at
the appropriate constitutional level, before the courts could be
invoked to overturn a State law on bare constitutional foreignaffairs grounds.3 89 At a minimum, the Court, following Barclays
Bank, could have been expected to hold that mere policy
statements emanating from sub-presidential
390 executive branch
law.
statutory
State
trump
not
officials could
Therefore, the Court's choice of a different and illprecedented course is a fact requiring an explanation. This Part
argues that the explanation lies in the Court's changing
understanding of federalism, read together with its new-found
individual rights libertarianism. Section B explains the linkage
388.
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2394 (2003) ("Indeed, it is
worth noting that Congress has done nothing to express disapproval of the President's
policy. Legislation along the lines of HVIRA has been introduced in Congress repeatedly,
but none of the bills has come close to making it into law.").
389.
See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REv. 226, 231
(2003) ("Garamendi failed to resolve the tension between, on the one hand, the Court's
recent retreat from dormant foreign commerce preemption, and on the other, the
expansive foreign affairs preemption adopted in Zschernig....").
390.
However, the Garamendi majority did seek to distinguish the Court's refusal in
Barclays Bank to give effect to executive branch policy pronouncements on two grounds:
First, in Barclays Bank the executive branch pronouncements were in the area of the
Foreign Commerce Clause, a matter expressly granted to congressional jurisdiction; and
second, in Garamendi, there was no suggestion that the sub-Cabinet level policy
pronouncements did not reflect the views of the President himself, so that there was no
need to apply a requirement for express presidential policy pronouncements in this case.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2391 nn.12-13.
Neither of these distinctions seems persuasive. They depend on the
characterization of issues as falling either under the "Foreign Commerce Clause" or
within the "field of foreign policy" when these areas in fact frequently overlap.
Furthermore, whether the President approves a particular statement of an executive
branch official is simply a matter of fact that cannot be determined by the judiciary in the
absence of discovery-as the Court appears to have done, one way in Barclays Bank and
the other way in Garamendi, to suit its preferred outcome. Compare Barclays Bank PLC
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 329-30 (1994) (stating that "Executive Branch
communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California's otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of worldwide
combined reporting"), with Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2381-82 (finding preemption of State
law based on the formation of a voluntary international organization that was never
officially mandated by the President).
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between the Court's foreign-relations-federalism jurisprudence
and the conceptual underpinnings of the Court's new individual
rights jurisprudence.
B. The "New Federalism"in ForeignRelations
Garamendi has two limbs. Section A considered the first
limb-the existence and effect of federal (especially executive
branch) power in foreign affairs. 3" Section B considers the
second-the Court's finding that California had no significant
interest in legislating the HVIRA"'
Foreign relations federalism, like domestic-federalism cases,
can be reconceptualized in ways that link it closely to the Court's
individual liberties cases. If foreign relations matters now
include questions that historically were within the province of
the States, then the inability of States to articulate a legitimate
interest in such matters would, under individual rights
limitations, also disable the States from legislating on them.
Under this approach, it would be unnecessary to resort to any
supposed structural limitations in order to hold a State
incompetent to legislate on matters that were exclusively within
the ambit of federal regulatory authority. Accordingly, as this
subsection explains, the underlying premises of Lawrence and
Grutter are useful, perhaps indispensable, in explaining the
outcome in Garamendi.
1. Legitimate State Interests in ForeignAffairs. The Court's
analysis of California's interest in the HVIRA can be understood
as an alternative holding, complementing its conclusion that the
nature of the federal interest alone was sufficient to trump any
State interest.39 3 But even if the analysis of the State's (lack of)
interest were considered dictum, the Court seems to have gone
out of its way to address that subject.394 Seemingly, the Court
wanted to emphasize that the State's authority to legislate, with
respect to moral questions, was meager, exactly as the State's
authority had been determined to be in Lawrence and other
substantive due process cases.395

391.
Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2386.
392.
Id. at 2393.
See id. at 2392 ("The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the
393.
state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.").
See id. (addressing the State's interest even though the Court declared that the
394.
"clear conflict" between the State law and federal policy was enough to find preemption).
395.
See id. at 2393 (stating that "the humanity underlying the state statute could
not give the State the benefit of any doubt in resolving the conflict with national policy").
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The Court reached the question of the strength of the State's
interest in an oblique and roundabout way-by eliding (while
also purporting to respect) the distinction between "conflict" and
"field" preemption of State law.396 It is useful to disentangle that
part of the Court's reasoning before addressing its overall
evaluation of the State's claimed interest.
Writing for the Garamendi majority, Justice Souter
characteristically purported to rely on Justice Harlanparticularly Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig.9 7 In that
opinion, Justice Harlan had refused to join the Zschernig
majority's claim that the federal government's supremacy in
foreign affairs operated to preempt State law in the entire "field"
of foreign relations, even when the federal government had
disclaimed any interest in barring the State's action.3 9 Instead,
Harlan opined that the Court should determine whether there
was an actual conflict between State and federal policy. 9 Justice
Souter merged Harlan's conflict-based analysis into what he
considered to be applicable dormant Commerce Clause precedent,
stating that "it would be reasonable to consider the strength of
the state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice,
when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before
declaring the state law preempted.""° By that move, conflict
preemption was collapsed (by way of the kind of interest-based
analysis appropriate to a conflicts-of-law case) into field
preemption.
The precise basis for Harlan's concurrence in the Zschernig
result was his conclusion that-contrary to the Court's earlier
holding in Clark-the Oregon probate statute at issue in both
cases was indeed "preempted by a 1923 [U.S.] treaty with
Germany."0 1 The Zschernig case then fell, in his view, under the
"actual conflict preemption" rubric. °2 Justice Harlan, therefore,
was far from endorsing the Garamendi Court's view "that state
laws not in conflict with any law, treaty, or executive agreement
Id. at 2389 & n.ll.
396.
397.
Id. at 2388-89.
398.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 458-59 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(indicating that prior Court decisions "have established that in the absence of a conflicting
federal policy. . . the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence"
regardless of the effect on foreign relations).
Garamendi, 124 S. Ct. at 2388-89 (discussing Justice Harlan's concurrence in
399.
Zschernig).
Id. at 2389.
400.
401.
Id. at 2389 n.10.
402.
Id. at 2389 (stating that when there is a conflicting federal policy the 'state
law[s] must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy'"
(quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440)).
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were nevertheless preempted on the strength of executive branch
[policy] statements."4 °3
By contrast, Garamedi's dormant foreign affairs preemption
approach treated the question of whether the (more expansive)
field or the (more restrictive) conflict preemption should be
employed as simply a variable dependent on the weight of the
underlying State interest-with field preemption operative "[ilf a
state were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign policy
with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state
responsibility," and with conflict preemption analysis applicable
when a State acted within an area of its "traditional
competence.'" 0 ' Thus, where Justice Harlan would have looked to
the intentions of federal treaty-makers to decide whether a State
law was preempted, the Garamendi Court characterized the
State's interest, evaluated it, and, after finding it insufficient,
allowed a (latent) Presidential foreign affairs authority to
That was emphatically not following Harlan's
preempt it.'
6
lead."
In any event, the Court scrutinized carefully the strength
and legitimacy of the interest asserted by California. The Court
questioned whether California's putative interest-"knowing
which insurers have failed to pay insurance claims"-was its
actual motive because "quite unlike a generally applicable 'blue
sky' law, HVIRA effectively singles out only policies issued by
European companies, in Europe, to European residents, at least

403.
Denning & Ramsey, supra note 56, at 878.
404.
Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2389 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 2392-93 (finding that federal policy preempted State law because the
405.
State's interest was not sufficient).
Another (albeit lesser) analytical flaw mars Justice Souter's opinion. He failed
406.
to explain why the determination of whether a State was acting in an area of its
"traditional competence" for purposes of assessing the potential implications for State law
of the Intrastate and Foreign Commerce Clauses should be translated automatically into
dormant foreign-affairs-power preemption. It is at least arguable that "tradition," with
respect to one of these allocations of authority, is not dispositive with respect to the other:
The States might conceivably have more authority to act in foreign affairs (despite the
acknowledged supremacy of the federal government in that area) than they do in
regulating foreign or interstate commerce. Justice Souter's answer to that suggestion
might be that the formation of an American Nation after the Revolutionary War in and of
itself nationalized all responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs; thus, there was no
power left to be reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment. See United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) ("The powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace,... to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if
they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality."). Notwithstanding the apparent
category error, the Court sought to characterize the nature of the State and federal
interests in Garamendi for the purposes of implementing a dormant foreign affairs
constitutional preemption analysis. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393.

716

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[42:3

4 °7 The Court concluded that "[1]imiting the public
55 years ago."
disclosure requirement to these policies raises great doubt that
the purpose of the California law is an evaluation of corporate
reliability in contemporary insuring in the State." 8 Such
reliance on a finding of such substantial under-inclusiveness
would be of significance in an equal protection or substantive due
process context only under an intermediate or strict scrutiny
standard of review. Thus, the Court's rejection of the State's
articulated interest-a justification that would appear to be
sufficient under any rational-basis test for legislation affecting
only economic interests, as well as even the Court's putatively
analogous Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence4 0 9indicates that the Court was scrutinizing the State's claim under
standard of review-but without
demanding
a more
acknowledging that it was doing so.
After excluding the possibility of a State interest focused on
the protection of consumers generally, the Court went on to
exclude the possibility of a State interest in benefiting a specific
group of State domiciliaries. 1 ° It asserted that "there is no
serious doubt that the state interest actually underlying HVIRA
is concern for the several thousand Holocaust survivors said to be
living in the State." 1 ' That the State had such an interest,
however, "does not displace general standards for evaluating a
State's claim to apply its forum law to a particular controversy or
transaction, under which the State's claim is not a strong one.""
In other words, the Court applied a conflict-of-laws-based
"interest" standard, in which post-occurrence change of domicile
did not, of itself, give the State an interest in applying its law to
nondomiciliaries with respect to facts and circumstances outside
its jurisdiction.""3 The logic of the reasoning appears to prohibit

407. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2392.
408.
Id.
409. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (accepting Iowa's claimed interest in health and safety as legitimate,
notwithstanding the under-inclusiveness of the means it chose to advance that interest,
and balancing that interest against the federal interest of trucking-regulation uniformity
in interstate commerce).
410. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (denying that the State had a sufficient interest
in protecting Holocaust survivors domiciled in the State).
Id.
411.
412. Id.
413. Id. (requiring that traditional standards be applied to determine the forum law
despite the fact that thousands of Holocaust survivors reside in the desired forum State);
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 311 (1981) (indicating that post-occurrence
change of domicile to the forum State in itself is an insufficient basis to justify applying
the forum law).
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States from legislating on the basis of universal jurisdiction to
vindicate the rights or interests of humanity.4 14
More sweepingly, the Court appeared to find the morallybased interests of States to be constitutionally insufficient to
enable them to legislate in the broad field of foreign-relations
matters. It concluded that, "against the responsibility of the
United States of America, the humanity underlying the state
statute could not give the State the benefit of any doubt in
resolving the conflict with national policy."415 Thus, the State's
moral interest-what Justice Souter called the "humanity
underlying the state statute"--weighed little in the Court's
calculus. 16' The State's interest was insufficient to let the law
stand, even though neither the federal executive nor the federal
legislature had spoken in a way that clearly invoked the
Supremacy Clause's requirement that only the federal
Constitution, federal treaties, or federal statutory law trumped
State law.'
The Court's approach in Garamendi cannot be dismissed as
an isolated example. In fact, Garamendi reveals a new
understanding on the Court's part of the limits of State
competence with respect to moral issues in foreign relations. For
example, in Nike v. Kasky,1 s two "centrists," Justice Breyer
joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented from the Court's dismissal
of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, on grounds
that revealed a similar depreciation of State competence to
pursue moral interests.419 Nike involved an attempt by a
California resident to rely on California Unfair Competition Law
to seek civil damages against Nike for unfair and deceptive trade
practices through allegedly making false statements and
omissions of fact concerning Nike's practices with respect to
foreign labor in the manufacture of its products overseas.42 As
the case came to the Court, the question was whether Nike's
advertising involved "commercial speech," subject to an

414.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§§ 402 cmt. k, 404 n.2 (1987) (raising the question whether States may exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction at least with respect to a limited class of offenses and arguing
that, under the Supremacy Clause, universal jurisdiction is a question of federal law).
415.
Garamendi,123 S. Ct. at 2393.
416.
Id.
417.
See id. (refusing to find a sufficient State interest and allowing State law to be
preempted based on conflicting national policy).
418.
123 S. Ct. 2554, 2559 (2003) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
419.
See id. at 2560 (arguing that the Court should have granted certiorari because
the State law, which discouraged certain kinds of speech, would cause "injury in fact").
420.
Id. at 2554-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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intermediate standard of review, or speech that was fully
protected by the First Amendment.4 21 In dissenting from the
denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer was ready to reach the merits
and sustain Nike's claim that it was entitled to First Amendment
protection.4 22 Together with other opinions of the Court,423 Justice
Breyer's dissent suggested that, had the Court reached the
merits, a majority could have been found to vindicate Nike. 4 '
The rationale that Justices Breyer and O'Connor offered
says more about foreign-affairs federalism than it does about the
First Amendment. Justice Breyer simply argued that California's
Unfair Trade Practices law could not be applied to create a
private right of action because no "economic interest" was
implicated in the matter; rather, "ideological" plaintiffs, such as
the one in this case, should pursue their "political battles" in
"other forums." In short, he found that California's legitimate
interest was merely "to maintain an honest commercial
marketplace. It thereby helps that marketplace better allocate
private goods and services."' 6 This interpretation of the State's
law-identifying economic efficiency and consumer welfare
maximization as the only legitimate State interests implicated in

421.
Id. at 2555.
Id. at 2564 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (opining that, if Nike could prove that its
422.
statements were not "unfair" under California law, it would prevail on nonfederal
grounds).
Justice Stevens, explaining the denial of the writ as improvidently granted, not
423.
only focused on jurisdictional issues as a ground for denial, id. at 2555-57 (Stevens, J.,
concurring), but also explained that the novelty of the First Amendment issues raised
warranted restraint in adjudication before a full factual record through a trial on the
merits was developed by the California courts. Id. at 2558. Justices Souter and Ginsburg
concurred with Justice Stevens, but felt compelled to suggest that some kind of First
Amendment protection for corporate speech, relating to matters of public concern, might
ultimately be warranted, observing that "[kinowledgeable persons should be free to
participate in" the debate about important public issues that was concerned not only with
Nike's labor practices, but with similar practices used by other multinational corporations
"without fear of unfair reprisal." Id. at 2559.
424. Id. at 2568 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
425.
Id. at 2567. Justice Breyer also addressed the "pragmatic" dangers that might
hamper the efficiency of government by turning public functions to private persons:
The delegation of state authority to private individuals authorizes a purely
ideological plaintiff, convinced that his opponent is not telling the truth, to bring
into the courtroom the kind of political battle better waged in other forums.
Where that political battle is hard fought, such plaintiffs potentially constitute a
large and hostile crowd freely able to bring prosecutions designed to vindicate
their beliefs, and to do so unencumbered by the legal and practical checks that
tend to keep the energies of public enforcement agencies focused upon more
purely economic harm.
Id.
426.
Id.
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Nike4 7-suggests a highly restrictive view of the legitimate goals
of the State with respect to the exposure of (conceivably) unjust
and exploitative foreign-trade practices. The conclusion that
facilitating the production of information relating to such unjust
enrichment is not a legitimate State interest seems predicatedlike the Court's holdings in Garamendi42 -- on a conception of the
role of the State as limited to pursuing economic efficiency
without regard to the community's moral commitments.
In sum, the Garamendi Court conceived of the States'
interests in terms that would generally disable States from
pursuing the moral values of their communities in relation to
many practices characteristic of multinational corporations.
Garamendi, read together with Justices Breyer's and O'Connor's
reasoning in Nike, suggests that, just as under Lawrence, States
may not enforce moral values to limit individual liberty, so
States' moral values may not be codified in ways conflicting with
executive branch policies favoring economic globalization.429
2. The Role of Elite Opinion in Garamendi. Garamendi also
displays an undue deference to international decisionmaking
when the latter does not have the effect of controlling law.43° This
deference is made clear by the Court's discussion of the federal
interest in the case, which the Court held to be sufficient to
trump the State law.43'
Relying on the fact that seeking "restitution for Nazi crimes
has in fact been addressed in executive Branch diplomacy and
formalized in treaties and executive agreements over the last
half century," the Court minimized the novelty of the
international agreement before it, arguing that "[v]indicating
victims injured by acts and omissions of enemy corporations in
wartime is thus within the traditional subject matter of foreign
policy in which national, not state, interests are overriding." 32 In
fact, these claims are far from being traditional subject matter of
international law, which in general has neither treated
Id. at 2566-67 (opining that unethical and immoral trade practices do not serve
427.
as an appropriate basis for a private right of action by an uninjured plaintiff).
See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. 2374, 2392-93 (2003) (contending
428.
that morality is not a sufficient State interest to preclude preemption).
See id. at 2393 (allowing federal preemption of State law regardless of the
429.
State's interest in morality).
Id. at 2392 n.14 (allowing preemption even though the President "is acting
430.
without express congressional authority, and thus does not have the 'plentitude of
Executive Authority' that control[s]. .. preemption").
See id. at 2392 ("The express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by the
431.
state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield.").
432.
Id. at 2390.
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433
multinational corporations as the bearers of legal personality 434
law.
nor held them accountable for violations of international
Moreover, as made clear by even the Court's own description of
the international process, based on executive agreements and
executive branch policy statements, the ICHEIC was an entirely
"voluntary organization formed in 1998 by several European
insurance companies, the State of Israel, Jewish and Holocaust
survivor associations, and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, the organization of American state insurance
commissioners. " " This public-private partnership was neither a
creature of, nor subject to, international law under any
conventional criteria. Its creation reflected a political process
generated by 6lite interest groups, who worked in coordination
with interested governments to resolve a legal and political
problem that, given the existence of Holocaust litigation in the
United States, would otherwise have been resolved in
unforeseeable ways by U.S. courts."6 Indeed, Garamendi
subordinated the characteristically American policy of favoring
disclosure to the values of an institutional 6lite, primarily a
European 6lite," 7 that favored individual and corporate privacy.
Thus, 6lite bargaining, supported by governments on both sides
of the Atlantic, removed the moral issue of restitution for
Holocaust victims from State governance and prevented
disclosure of the possible culpability of corporations either
through American-style judicial discovery or through the
transparency and public accountability mandated by State
regulatory law.43 s

433.
Multinational corporations "are not international legal persons in the technical
sense" and "are not generally subject to obligations and generally do not enjoy rights
under international law." LORi FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 421 (4th ed. 2001). But cf. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 35-36 (Feb. 5) (establishing that the State of
incorporation, rather than the corporation in its own right, may assert the right of
diplomatic protection with respect to the expropriation of corporate property by a host
State).
434.
See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of
Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 488 (2001) (arguing for the development of an
international human rights norm under which corporations, like States, would be held
responsible under international law for violations of internationally recognized human
rights).
435.
Garamendi,123 S. Ct. at 2382.
436.
See generally MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS (2003) (explaining Holocaust restitution litigation,
and cited in Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2380).
437.
See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2392 (stating that "California's indiscriminate
disclosure provisions place a handicap on the ICHEIC's effectiveness (and raise a further
irritant to the European allies) by undercutting European privacy protections").
438.
See id. at 2393 (rejecting State interest in morality as sufficient to avoid
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3. Summary. The logic that undergirds the Court's
substantive due process and equal protection cases--denying the
States any legitimate interest in enacting communitarian moral
judgments with respect to private conduct-is congruent with the
Court's holding in Garamendi that the State could not deploy its
traditional regulatory powers over domestically operating
insurance companies to help secure restitution and justice for
Holocaust survivors.439 The "humanity underlying the state
statute" proved to be an insufficient State interest to withstand
the Court's heightened scrutiny. Although neither Congress nor
the President had demonstrated a clear intent to preempt the
State's law (indeed, the contrary was true), the Court determined
that its unilateral constitutional intervention was necessary to
protect the political branches from a State's putative
encroachment on their generalized "foreign affairs" powers.44 ° The
Court offered no argument that its intervention was needed to
rectify some structural defect in the political process, such as an
inherent vulnerability in the federal political branches that the
State was exploiting in order to usurp an authority that the
Constitution had located elsewhere.4" Rather than allowing the
normal political process to decide the fate of the State's law, the
Court deferred to the wishes of corporate and governmental
leaders in Europe in order to remove what it perceived as a likely
source of friction in dealings between them and our own national
leadership.442 Moreover, the Court's deference to the consensus
views of international 6lites may have been misplaced: It was not
clear how far the object of that consensus was to secure a longoverdue measure of corrective justice, as opposed to avoiding
embarrassing publicity and shutting down public conversation on
the nature of corporate responsibility for human rights
violations. Therefore, in foreign affairs as well as domestic ones,
the Court's "new federalism" leaves the States largely denuded of
the power to legislate and enforce moral opinion. By limiting the
States to the instrumental role of promoting economic efficiency,
preemption by national policy).
See id. at 2392-93 (characterizing the State's interest in securing justice for
439.
Holocaust survivors as insufficient).
See id. at 2391-92 (explaining that allowance of the State law would
440.
compromise the President's capacity to "'speak for the nation with one voice'" when
dealing with other countries) (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363, 381 (2000)).
441. Id. at 2386 (basing its decision on the premise that uniformity in dealing with
foreign nations requires that at some point State law "must yield to the National
Government's policy").
442. Id. at 2390 (finding in favor of the Executive's policy because allowance of the
State law could generate "'sources of friction'").
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Garamendi further entrenches the constitutionalization of the
Market State.
V.

WHITHER?

Our review of the Court's decisions should have made it
clear that fundamental premises of constitutional law are
undergoing a tectonic shift. These judicial developments can be
attributed to the perceived need to reorient the Nation's
constitutional structures in the aftermath of the Cold War and
the emergence of a radically different international strategic
environment.443 What is happening in the case law reflects, on the
judicial plane, the processes by which the Nation State is steadily
yielding its place to a new order, differing from the older both in
the ways the State relates to those it governs and in the ways it
relates to other international actors."4 The Court is more or less
self-consciously engaged in the project of adapting and
restructuring the Constitution so that it can be made to fit the
perceived requirements of the multicultural, value-free,
libertarian Market State whose emergence Professor Bobbitt
envisages and describes. The Court's individual rights, equal
protection jurisprudence, and federalism jurisprudence converge
to serve the same transformative end.
The Court seems to believe that the liquidation of the States
as moral communities-a role that American federalism, with its
roots in the Central Tradition, has traditionally assigned to
them, and that they have consistently exercised throughout
American history-is essential to the emerging constitutional
order of the Market State.4 4 5 The Court increasingly perceives the

States as serving only instrumental purposes within a globalized
market. The States' differing regulatory, tax, and labor policies
offer packages that can attract and provide incentives to different
demographic groups, stimulate external investment, and lead to
the discovery of useful social innovations. Thus far, the States
may find an acceptable place within the overarching Market
443.

See Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and

the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1015-16 (2004) (contending that the
end of the Cold War marked an irreversible change in the way the Court interpreted the
Constitution regarding separation of power and individual rights).
444.
See John 0. McGinnis, The Decline of the Western Nation State and the Rise of
the Regime of InternationalFederalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 903, 903-04 (1996) (opining

that "[blecause of regional and global trade and open financial markets, nation states no
longer exercise as substantial control over their internal economic affairs as they once
did").
445.
See Garamendi, 123 S. Ct. at 2393 (illustrating the Court's refusal to recognize

morality as a legitimate State interest sufficient to avoid preemption).
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State Constitution. But should the States attempt to enact laws
for noninstrumental, normative purposes-most especially, for
the sake of upholding traditional moral judgments-they would
risk subordinating economic imperatives to noneconomic ones,
and must thus be deemed to have no "legitimate" interest in the
legislation. In particular, the Supreme Court has emphatically (if
unthinkingly) barred the States from playing active, influential
and humane roles in an emerging "global civil society" and from
taking any significant part in the process of "globalization-frombelow."446
Will the Court's constitutional innovations succeed-where
"success" is primarily measured in obtaining 61ite and popular
acceptance within the United States? And will the Court also be
successful in securing for the United States competitive
advantages against its strategic rivals? The answers cannot yet
be known. In attempting to assess the likely outcomes, however,
we think that it is useful to press the question whether the
Court's project is not likely to encounter at least three major
difficulties.
First, the Court's conception of federalism seems to require
that society's most searing and divisive social problems be
decided by the federal judiciary and at the national level. The
Court's reasoning appears to be that such an approach is most
likely to lead to a stable, peaceable, national consensus. Yet the
Court's own intervention in the national debate on abortiondespite the Court's expressed wish that it be otherwise-has only
exacerbated, embittered, and prolonged that controversy.447
Similarly, the rash and ill-considered intervention of the
Massachusetts judiciary into the question of same-sex
marriage, 4 1 in an opinion that repeatedly cited and relied on the
Supreme Court's Lawrence decision, inflamed rather than
quieted public opinion."' A federalism that does not acknowledge

446.
See RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 130-31 (1999)
(depicting "globalization-from-below" as "the linking of knowledge and political action in
hundreds of civil initiatives"); see also RICHARD A. FALK, THE DECLINING WORLD ORDER:
AMERICA'S IMPERIAL GEOPOLITICS 87-88 (2004) (defining and characterizing "global civil
society").
The Court's attempt in Casey to quiet the national controversy over abortion has
447.
been no more successful than its earlier effort in Dred Scott to take the issue of slavery in
the territories "out of politics." Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403 (1856)
(deciding whether a descendant of a slave could become a member of the political
community); see ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 193 (1992) (arguing
that the Dred Scott decision "only provoked heightened disobedience and ignited more
violence").
448.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
449. See id. (recognizing that many people hold strong convictions regarding same-
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the need for settlements of refractory social issues both
democratically and at the State level-even at the expense of
less
be notably
uniformity-will
nation-wide
securing
"pragmatic" than a more traditional kind of federalism.
Second, the very libertarianism that the Court seems intent
on weaving into constitutional law may well prove to damage the
United States' position in international rivalry rather than to
enhance it. Since President Bush first raised the question in the
immediate aftermath of September 11,450 Americans have asked,
"'Why do they hate us?"'' The answer must be, in part, that
aspects of our moral practice and culture have become
increasingly unattractive to hundreds of millions of people
worldwide-many of whom happen to live in areas that are likely
to generate grave strategic threats to the United States.4 52
Although it is true that Osama bin Laden rarely indicts popular
American morality, he has on occasion done so;453 and it seems
safe to say that the contempt and loathing he expresses resonate
with millions of others.4 54 Apologists for the moral order and
practice of the emerging American Market State-what they
usually characterize as "liberal values"-appear to acknowledge
that our course of conduct may well involve us in a civilizational
"war with Islam."5' 5 But such a war, if it comes, would be
devastating even to the victor; and its final issue would be
uncertain.

sex marriage).
450. See Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response
to the Terrorist Attacks of Sept. 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001).
451.
Id. at 1141.
452.
For a penetrating study of these perceptions, see MEIC PEARSE, WHY THE REST
HATES THE WEST: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS OF GLOBAL RAGE 11-13 (2004) (discussing
other cultures' perceptions of today's American society and the potential threats that
those perceptions pose).
453.
In his letter to America dated November 24, 2002, Osama bin Laden said, "We
call you to be a people of manners, principles, honour, and purity; to reject the immoral
acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling's, [sic] and trading with
interest.... It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed by the
history of mankind." Letter from Osama bin Laden to America (Nov. 24, 2002), available
at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4552895-110490,00.html (last visited Oct.
1, 2005). Bin Laden's aversion was anticipated by Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian thinker who
was one of the intellectual fathers of radical Islam. See PAUL BERMAN, TERROR AND
LIBERALISM 99-100 (2003) (stating that Qutb's vanguard would foreshadow a Muslim
rebellion "against the liberal values of the West").
454.
See Daniel Pipes, Who Is the Enemy?, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE, Feb. 20, 2002,
available at http://CapMag.com/article.asp?ID=1427 (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (estimating
that 10% to 15% of the world Muslim population, or about 100 million to 150 million
persons, are sympathetic to al Qaeda's vision).
455.
See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE
OF REASON 109-10 (2004) (claiming that we are or may be at war with Islam).

20051

MURAL UUMMUAI

,;

Finally, the Court's adventures in constitution-making may
not recommend themselves to the American people at large
(however much they may gratify the dlites who form the Court's
most sympathetic audience). Perhaps the entrepreneurial Market
State does indeed best serve the interests of the American people
at this juncture in history; perhaps no other form of
constitutional order-including other variants of the Market
State, like Europe's or Japan's-is realistically available to us
now. History throws up new possibilities, but it also limits them.
Conceivably, therefore, the Court might be rendering the
American people an unavowed service by practicing "the subtle
politics of men like [the Roman emperors] Augustus and Tiberius
who likewise allowed the forms of the preceding constitution (a
republic in that instance) to subsist while the thing itself existed
no longer and could not possibly be brought back." 56 Even so, the
American people might not welcome the favor. As Hegel also
pointed out, even though the constitution that Napol6on imposed
on "the Spaniards was more rational than what they had
57
before,... they recoiled from it as from something alien.""
The choice of our constitutional fate should rest with the
American people, not with our courts.
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